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The devastating events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the United States no 
longer enjoys a sense of invulnerability to attacks on American soil.  On 25 November 
2002, President Bush signed legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  The new department’s strategic objectives include: 1) preventing terrorist attacks 
within the United States, 2) reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 3) 
minimize the damage and recover from the attacks that do occur.  Intelligence will play a 
critical role in preventing future terrorist attacks against America’s homeland.  The DHS 
transition team faces many questions and challenges.  A major component of the new 
DHS requires a dedicated effort to monitoring, analyzing, and utilizing intelligence about 
domestic threats to national security.  This thesis defines, describes, and advocates the 
role of intelligence in the proposed DHS.  The role of intelligence in the new DHS is two-
fold: 1) a process for the intergovernmental coordination of agencies involved in 
homeland security, and 2) a tailored, all-source fusion product to support DHS decision-
makers.  Intelligence has emerged as the one common preventive measure applicable 
across the homeland security continuum.  Defining the role of intelligence in the DHS 
and creating the means to accomplish this new role for intelligence is no easy task.  Once 
defined, this thesis focuses on how DHS can accomplish this new role for intelligence.  
Published proposals and ideas in general circulation provide a theoretical baseline of how 
DHS can accomplish this two-fold approach.  In order to uncover the ‘ground truth,’ data 
collection incorporated personal insight from experts spanning across federal, state, and 
local intelligence and law enforcement communities.  The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for how the transition team tasked with creating an information and 
analysis assessment center within DHS.  DHS policymakers must focus on creating an 
internal intelligence organizational structure, manage the country’s domestic intelligence 
process, establish an information-sharing network, incorporate the use of open source 
information (OSINT), and ensure analytical quality within the new department.  The time 
has come to create a mix of spooks and suits capable of preventing future terrorist attacks 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Today we are taking historic action to defend the dangers of a new era.  
With my signature, this act of Congress will create a new Department of 
Homeland Security, ensuring our efforts to protect this country are 
comprehensive and united…This act takes the next critical steps in 
defending our country against the continuing threat of terrorism.  The 
threat of mass murder on our own soil will be met with a united, effective 
response.  (President George W. Bush during speech given on 25 
November 2002, signing of the Homeland Security Act)1 
By ‘intelligence’, we mean every sort of information about the enemy and 
his country—the basis, in short, of our plans and operations.  (Carl von 
Clausewitz, On War, 1832)2 
A. PROTECTING THE HOMELAND 
The devastating events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the United States no 
longer maintains a sense of invulnerability to attacks on American soil.  Protecting 
America’s homeland requires new instruments of power.  On 25 November 2002, 
President George W. Bush signed legislation creating the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).  The creation of the DHS represents one of the most significant changes 
in the United States federal government since the National Security Act of 1947.  DHS 
attempts to reorganize 22 previously disparate domestic agencies into a unified national 
homeland security entity.  The DHS transition team, headed by Homeland Security 
Secretary Tom Ridge, faces many questions and challenges. 
One area of concern for the new department is intelligence support.  Intelligence 
will play a critical role in the nation’s counterterrorist effort.  The information analysis 
element within DHS will have the responsibility for monitoring, acquiring, and analyzing 
all-source intelligence about domestic threats from agencies within the intelligence and 
law enforcement communities.  In addition, the DHS intelligence entity will rely on 
intelligence generated from state and local government agencies.  As a consumer of 
                                                 
1 “Homeland Security Agency a Reality,” MSNBC News, 25 November 2002 (News Service On-Line); 
available from http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/8333668.asp.  
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed ed., ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117. 
2 
intelligence, DHS will compete with other members of the national security community 
to ensure priority intelligence requirements are met. 
Initially, this thesis defines the role of intelligence in the new Department of 
Homeland Security.  Combining a detailed cross-section of primary and secondary 
sources uncovered the ‘ground truth’ about the newly defined role of intelligence in the 
DHS.  Data collection incorporated the personal insights of civilian and military 
intelligence and law enforcement experts spanning across federal, state, and local levels.  
Defining the new role of intelligence in the DHS is no easy task.  Numerous proposals 
and ideas in general circulation recommend solutions for DHS to accomplish the role of 
intelligence.  Through an extensive description of current proposals and ideas, and the 
acquisition of first hand inputs from intelligence and law enforcement professionals 
tasked with homeland security responsibilities, this thesis defines the role of intelligence 
in the proposed DHS.  Once defined, the thesis describes how DHS can accomplish this 
role.  Lastly, this thesis advocates recommendations for DHS policymakers tasked with 
creating a new DHS intelligence entity.  For the DHS to successfully accomplish the 
newly defined role of intelligence it must: 1) create an internal intelligence organizational 
structure, 2) effectively manage the domestic intelligence process, 3) establish an 
information-sharing network for federal, state, and local agencies, 4) incorporate the use 
of open source information (OSINT), and 5) ensure analytical quality within the DHS 
intelligence entity.  
B. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 
1. Defining ‘Intelligence’ 
Intelligence is a critical factor in preventing future terrorist attacks against the 
United States.  However, definitions of intelligence vary.  For example, Carl von 
Clausewitz states, “By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy 
and his country—the basis, in short, of our plans and operations.”3  Other experts 
emphasize the predictive nature of intelligence.  Shlomo Gazit, Chief of Israeli Military 
Intelligence from 1974-1979 states,  
In antiquity (and to this day, in some countries) kings and generals used to 
act on the advice of diviners or fortunetellers.  Not so the statesmen and 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 117. 
3 
army commanders of today.  Nevertheless, they find it hard to accept a 
situation in which nobody can foretell the future for them.  Many of them 
hope, or delude themselves, that the intelligence system serving them can 
fulfill this purpose.4   
Intelligence is a workable concept.  If this were a text on any other government 
function—defense, housing, transportation, diplomacy, agriculture—there would be little 
or no confusion about, or need to explain, what was being discussed.5   
Before examining the role of intelligence in the proposed DHS, it is necessary to 
define the definition of  “intelligence” used throughout this thesis.  A review of various 
sources provided a workable definition of intelligence.  Joint Pub 1-02, defines 
intelligence as “information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through 
observation, investigation, analysis or understanding.”6  Naval Doctrine Publication 2: 
Naval Intelligence, points out a clear distinction between information and intelligence.  
“Information is an assimilation of data that has been gathered, but not fully correlated, 
analyzed, or interpreted.”7  Intelligence results from the manipulation of information.  
“Intelligence is “the product resulting from the collection, exploitation, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning 
foreign countries and areas.”8  Mark Lowenthal9, in his book, Intelligence: From Secrets 
to Policy points out several ways to think about intelligence: intelligence as a process, 
intelligence as a product, and intelligence as an organization.10  Robert David Steele11, in 
                                                 
4 Quoted Joint Publication 2-0: Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 09 March 2000) [publications on-line]; available from Joint Electronic Library, DTIC, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpintelligenceseriespubs.htm, I-1. 
5 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2000), 1. 
6 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 [as amended through 09 January 2003]) 
[publications on-line]; available from Joint Electronic Library, DTIC, http://www.dtic.mil, 261. 
7 Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 
1994), 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mark M. Lowenthal has more than twenty-three years’ experience in the executive and legislative 
branches of government as an intelligence official.  He currently is an adjunct professor in the graduate 
programs at Columbia University and George Washington University and is a senior principal in the 
Intelligence Directorate of SRA International, Inc., where he is involved in a variety of projects in support 
of the U.S. intelligence community.  Biographical information obtained from his book Intelligence: From 
Secrets to Policy.   
10 Lowenthal, 8. 
4 
an email exchange on the Naval Intelligence Professionals discussion forum, points out, 
“Intelligence is tailored decision-support, consisting of a process that leverages all 
available sources with the best available software and services to provide ‘on target’ 
intelligence answers—not necessarily products—that are generally actionable and always 
useful.”12  For purposes of this thesis intelligence is defined as the process and product 
by which information, both classified and unclassified, is collected and analyzed to 
provide policy makers with tailored-decision support on national security issues. 
2. A New Domestic Role for Intelligence 
Traditionally intelligence focused its efforts abroad.  For example, before the fall 
of the Soviet Union, most intelligence agencies focused on containing the Soviet threat.  
In the 1990s, intelligence struggled with redefining the threats to the United States.  The 
attacks on 11 September 2001 demonstrated the traditional foreign focus of intelligence 
no longer remains.  Domestic intelligence is required to thwart future attacks launched by 
Al Qaeda and other groups hostile toward the United States.  The United States requires a 
concerted effort in organizing domestic intelligence.  The necessary components of 
homeland security intelligence, or concrete entities, have yet to formulate. 
3. The Role of Intelligence in DHS 
Much debate has surrounded the role of intelligence in the newly established 
DHS.  The legislation is explicit that, 
Except as otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary (of DHS) 
shall have such access as the Secretary considers necessary to all 
information, including reports, assessments, analyses, and unevaluated 
intelligence relating to threats of terrorism against the United States and to 
other areas of responsibility assigned to the Secretary, and to all 
information concerning infrastructures or other vulnerabilities of the 
United States to terrorism, whether or not such information has been 
                                                 
11 Robert David Steele, an intelligence expert with over twenty-five years of experience in military 
and strategic intelligence, is the author of On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA 
International Press, 2000 and OSS International Press, 2001), as well as The New Craft of Intelligence: 
Personal, Public, and Political (OSS International Press, 2002).  He is the founder and CEO of Open 
Source Solutions Inc. (OSS).  Biographical information obtained from OSS website at: www.oss.net.   
12 Robert David Steele, in an email exchange to members of the Naval Intelligence Professionals 
organization, 03 August 2002, Naval Intelligence Professionals on-line discussion forum.  For more 
information on the Naval Intelligence Professionals visit the organization website at: 
http://www.navintpro.org.   
5 
analyzed, that may be collected, possessed, or prepared by any agency of 
the Federal Government.13   
A major component of the new DHS will be devoted to monitoring, analyzing, and 
utilizing all-source intelligence regarding threats to national security.  Legislation tasks 
the new department with developing, as part of the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Division, an intelligence center that will focus on terrorist 
threats and assessing vulnerabilities to attack.14  The department, primarily as an 
intelligence consumer, will rely on information from other intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The role of intelligence for the proposed Department of 
Homeland Security is two-fold: 1) a process for the intergovernmental coordination of 
agencies involved in homeland security, and 2) a tailored, all-source fusion product to 
support DHS decision-makers and homeland security operational units. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis has six chapters.  Chapter I: “Introduction,” introduces one of the 
challenges for the new Department of Homeland Security, defining the role of 
intelligence.  Through consultation of various sources, the author defines the term 
‘intelligence’ and the role of intelligence in the proposed DHS. 
Chapter II: “DHS Background,” describes the current institutional status of the 
Department of Homeland Security (legislation, DHS proposals, organizational structure, 
and transition).  Since the DHS is currently in the transitional stage descriptions are based 
on proposals and ideas, not concrete entities.  In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
against America on 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush decided 22 
previously disparate domestic agencies needed to be coordinated into one department to 
protect the nation against threats to the homeland.15  This chapter provides a sense of 
ground truth for DHS organizational structure. 
                                                 
13 Richard A. Best, Jr., Homeland Security: Intelligence Support (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, 18 November 2002), 2-3, Library of Congress Congressional 
Research Service, Order Code RS21283. 
14 James Jay Carafano, Prospects for the Homeland Security Department: The 1947 Analogy 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 12 September 2002).  Retrieved from 
CSBA Website on 23 September 2002 at: http//: www.csbaonline.org.  
15 Quote from US Department of Homeland Security, 31 January 2003.  Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp, Keyword: DHS Organization. 
6 
Chapter III: “What’s Being Proposed,” describes some of the different proposals 
and ideas in general circulation for how DHS can accomplish this newly defined role for 
intelligence.  This chapter breaks down how DHS can develop an intelligence process to 
coordinate the intelligence gathering of federal, state, and local agencies in order to 
produce tailored all-source decision support to DHS policymakers.  Provisions include 
the setting up an internal DHS intelligence organizational structure, management of the 
domestic intelligence process, creating information-sharing network between 
federal/state/local agencies, and developing an internal analysis capability.  Existing 
proposals and ideas also address what DHS is not going to do such as domestic 
collection.  Data collection incorporated primary and secondary source material obtained 
from national intelligence and law enforcement agencies such as the CIA, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), US Navy, Office of Homeland Security, and law 
enforcement working groups.  In addition, research included state and local intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies such as the Terrorist Early Warning (TEW) working 
group.  By describing different provisions, this chapter focuses on what is being proposed 
for the role of intelligence in DHS.  
Chapter IV: “Solving the Issues,” evaluates the positive and negative points of 
existing proposals.  Numerous models and grassroots initiatives provide examples for 
DHS officials to follow.  As a consumer of intelligence, DHS will place great demands 
on the Intelligence Community.  For example, military intelligence’s success in joint 
warfare provides a model for DHS’ intelligence organizational structure.  Informal 
information sharing-networks developed by the TEW in Los Angeles demonstrate 
sharing intelligence is not as technical as many proposals suggest.  Despite relying on 
intelligence from other agencies like the CIA and FBI, the department will still require 
internal intelligence analysis.  DHS requires a cadre of skilled analysts.  Current DHS 
policy structure and resource allocation may provide obstacles to analyst recruitment.  
The department cannot afford to create “second-class analysts.” 
Chapter V “Conclusions,” advocates solutions DHS should incorporate to carry 
out the new domestic role of intelligence.  The DHS must strive toward a more 
collaborative consideration of ideas, alternative views, and, ultimately, solid analysis 
upon which to make decisions.  Quality analysis will enhance the security of our country.  
7 
This chapter advocates several solutions for DHS: military intelligence’s model is a good 
place to start, do not forget the value-added of OSINT, establish a “personal” information 
sharing system, and ensure internal analytical quality.  The thesis offers insight and 
recommendations for the DHS transition team tasked to develop a new intelligence 
organization within DHS to safeguard the nation against terrorist attacks on US soil.  The 
time has come to create a mix of spooks and suits to meet the needs of the country.   
Chapter VI “Prologue” provides a brief description how the theoretical discussion 
and findings of this thesis serves a second purpose.  The Naval Postgraduate School in 
conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security 
recently established a homeland security master’s program.  The new graduate-level 
curriculum aims to build a cadre of homeland security experts around the country.  One 
of the core courses for the curriculum id devoted to the role of intelligence.  Intelligence 
will play an important role in America’s counterterrorist effort.  The potential for real 
world applicability of the issues and topics presented in the following pages, in the long-
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II. DHS INSTITUTIONAL STATUS 
The United States Congress has taken an historic and bold step forward to 
protect the American people by passing legislation to create the 
Department of Homeland Security….  This bill includes the major 
components of my proposal—providing the intelligence analysis and 
infrastructure protection, strengthening our borders, improving the use of 
science and technology to counter weapons of mass destruction, and 
creating a comprehensive response and recovery division.  (Statement by 
the President George W. Bush, November 19 2002)16 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The devastating events of 11 September 2001 forced the United States to focus 
federal, state, and local efforts in protecting the homeland.  The country no longer 
maintains a sense of invulnerability to domestic attacks.  In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks against America on 11 September, President George W. Bush decided 22 
previously disparate domestic agencies needed to be coordinated into one department to 
protect the nation against threats to the homeland.17  Intelligence will play a critical role 
in the new department.  Before addressing proposals for the role of intelligence in DHS, a 
brief description of DHS organizational structure is required.  This chapter describes the 
current institutional status of the Department of Homeland Security (legislation, DHS 
proposals, organization, and transition).  With the DHS currently in the transitional stage, 
descriptions reflect proposals and ideas, not concrete entities.  After providing a sense of 
current ‘ground truth’ in terms of DHS organizational structure the chapter defines the 
new role intelligence will play in DHS.   
B. PAVING THE WAY FOR DHS 
In June 2002, President Bush proposed the creation of a new Cabinet-level 
department to establish a unified effort against terrorist threats to the United States at 
home.  The President’s plan, outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
came under intense scrutiny from members of Congress.  Partisan disputes rang out on 
Capitol Hill.  However, after the November 2002 Congressional elections the homeland 
                                                 
16 Quoted from White House Official Website, 31 January 2003.  Available at: 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021119-4.html. 
17 Quote from US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp, Keyword: DHS Organization. 
10 
security bill finally came to fruition.  The road to passing the homeland security bill was 
tortuous to the end.18  On 25 November 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland 
Security Act, marking one of the most significant transformations of the United States 
government since the 1947 National Security Act.  The new law went into effect on 24 
January 2003.  Before the Homeland Security Act, the United States’ domestic security 
organization appeared complex.  Coordination and integration between federal, state, and 
local agencies was limited.  Figure 1 depicts the domestic security organizational 
structure before the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Organizational Structure Before the Creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
 
The new DHS looks to consolidate nearly 170,000 workers from 22 previously 
disparate domestic agencies into one department to protect the country against threats to 
                                                 
18 “Bush to Sign Homeland Dept. Bill,” New York Times, November 25, 2002.  Retrieved from NY 
Times Website on 25 November 2002 at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/politics/AP-Bush-Homeland-
Security.html/ex=1039242654&ei=1&en=9bbc98504ec515d7.  
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US soil.  The National Security Strategy states three strategic objectives for DHS: 1) 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 2) reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and 3) minimize damage and recover from attacks that do occur.19  In order to 
accomplish its mission, the new Department of Homeland Security must mobilize and 
focus resources spanning across the federal government, state and local governments, the 
private sector, and the American people.  Terrorists today can strike at any place, any 
time, and with virtually any weapon in a permanent condition and these new threats 
require our country to design a new security structure.20 
C. DHS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The first priority of the new department is prevention.  How can DHS protect the 
nation against further terrorist attacks at home?  DHS is developing an organizational 
structure to coordinate the efforts of agencies tasked with homeland security 
responsibilities.  Component agencies will analyze threats and intelligence, guard our 
borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and coordinate the response of our 
nation for future emergencies.21  DHS also strives to establish subordinate offices to 
support protecting the rights of American citizens and managing public services, such as 
natural disaster relief.   
1.   DHS Components 
The DHS organizational structure delineates five major Divisions, or 
“Directorates”: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, Science and Technology, Management, and Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection.22  In addition to the five Directorates, several other critical 
agencies, previously or newly established, fold into the new DHS organizational 
structure.  The United States Coast Guard, Secret Service, Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Office of State and Local Government Coordination, and the 
                                                 
19 Strategic objectives quoted from the National Strategy for Homeland Security, released by the 
Office of the Press Secretary (Washington, D.C.:  July 2002).  Retrieved from the White House Official 
Website on 17 July 2002 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/book/index.html.    
20 Quoted from White House Official Website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect2.html.  
21 Quoted from US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp.  
22 Quote from US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=10&content=11.  
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Office of Private Sector Liaison will come under the new department.  Figure 2 depicts 
the organizational structure of the new DHS, as of 01 March 2003.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Structure of New Department of Homeland Security. 
 
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Division will provide the 
central repository for DHS intelligence support.  Intelligence will play a critical role in 
the new organization.    
2.  DHS Transition 
A Homeland Security Transition Planning Office (TPO) began contingency 
planning for the new Department in June 2002.  Under the guidance of the Office of 
Homeland Security, TPO members focused on ensuring a smooth and expedient 
transition occurred following legislative approval of the new Department of Homeland 
Security.  About 50 representatives from the tapped agencies, Office of Personnel 
Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House developed 
options that would allow DHS to achieve new and enhanced capabilities in the most 
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effective and timely manner.23  TPO transition teams structured themselves in teams 
paralleling the proposed Directorates of the new Department.  Steven Cooper, Special 
Assistant to the President, Senior Director for Information Integration and Chief 
Information Officer, Office of Homeland Security CIO, spoke about some of the 
challenges the DHS transition team faced.  During a speech on 19 August 2002, at the 
Government Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security24 he stated, 
“Pockets of experts exist in the United States, the question is how does the Office of 
Homeland Security get to them?”25  The DHS transition team focused on coordinating 
homeland security initiatives and resources.   
Effective 27 January 2003, the Department of Homeland Security Headquarters 
set up location at the Nebraska Avenue Center (NAC) in Northwest Washington, D.C.26 
The NAC is a United States Navy facility shared by the Office of Homeland Security 
staff.27  The site provided the necessary components for standing up DHS operations 
immediately.  However, the makeshift military offices reside several miles from the 
White House, the department’s number one customer.  Most of the department’s 
personnel will work out of the NAC.  In addition, some DHS personnel will work out of 
the newly proposed Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) (discussed further in 
section E of this chapter). 
President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act on 25 November 2002, creating 
the new Department of Homeland Security.  Concurrently the President submitted a 
Homeland Security Reorganization Plan to Congress (See Appendix A).  Appendix A 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Government Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security, 19-21 August 2002, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Conference sponsored by The Government Emerging Technology Alliance 
(GETA), brought together members of various federal, state, and local communities to address Homeland 
Security-related information.  Co-sponsored by the US Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement 
Community, Department of Defense, federal, local, and state agencies, the convention focused on 
gathering, sharing and interpreting information across the wide spectrum of agencies tasked with 
contributing to Homeland Security. 
25 Speech given by Steven Cooper, Special Assistant to the President, Senior Director for Information 
Integration and Chief Information Officer, Office of Homeland Security CIO, at the Government 
Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,  [19 August 
2002].  (For typewritten notes of Steven Cooper’s speech, see Appendix C). 




provides a copy of the President’s reorganization plan.  On 24 January 2003, the DHS 
officially came into existence.  Setting up the new department will take time.  Timelines 
vary on when the department will reach full operational status.  By law, the DHS 
Secretary has one year from the time the Department becomes effective to bring all of the 
22 agencies into the new organization.28  01 March 2003 marked the creation of the 
department.  Several agencies such as the Customs Service and the Secret Service began 
transitioning to the new department.   
3. Leadership 
The creation of the new department establishes a single Cabinet official assigned 
the daunting task of protecting the American homeland from domestic terrorist threats.  
President Bush nominated former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the first 
Secretary of Homeland Security.  After receiving Congressional approval, Secretary 
Ridge became the 15th executive of President Bush’s Cabinet.  President Bush also 
nominated several other key senior leadership positions.  For example, he nominated 
Gordon R. England, a former military contracting executive and Secretary of the Navy, as 
Mr. Ridge’s deputy.29  Many of the senior positions within the new department remain 
vacant (See Appendix B).  Appendix B provides a current list of DHS senior officials and 
their nomination status.   
4.  DHS Agencies 
Numerous component agencies will transfer to the new DHS.  The agencies slated 
to become part of the Department of Homeland Security will be housed in one of the four 
major Directorates: Border and Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness 
and Response (EPR), Science and Technology (S&T), and Information Analysis and 
Information Protection (IAIP).30 
BTS unifies all major border security and transportations operations, to include:   
• The US Customs Service (Treasury) 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Richard W. Stevenson,  “Signing Homeland Security Bill, Bush Appoints Ridge as Secretary,” New 
York Times, 26 November 2002.  Retrieved from NY Times Website on 29 November 2002 at:  
www.nytimes.com. 
30 Quoted from US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=13. 
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• Immigration and Naturalization Service (part) (Justice) 
• The Federal Protective Service (GSA) 
• The Transportation Security Administration (Transportation) 
• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury) 
• Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (part) (Agriculture) 
• Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice) 
The EPR Directorate oversees coordinates disaster preparedness and response, to 
include: 
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
• Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical 
System (HHS) 
• Nuclear Incident Response Team (Energy) 
• Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice) 
• National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI) 
The S&T Directorate seeks to coordinate and utilize advancements in science and 
technology to further secure the homeland.  The following assess to be part of this effort: 
• CBRN Countermeasures Programs (Energy) 
• Environmental Measurements Laboratory (Energy) 
• National BW Defense Analysis Center (Defense) 
• Plum Island Animal Disease Center (Agriculture) 
Legislation directs the IAIP Directorate to analyze and assess all-source 
intelligence and information from other agencies (CIA, FBI, NSA, etc.) involving threats 
to homeland security and evaluate vulnerabilities in the nation’s infrastructure.  IAIP 
brings together: 
• Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (Commerce) 
• Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA) 
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• National Communications System (Defense) 
• National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI) 
• Energy Security and Assurance Program (Energy) 
The creation of the new DHS marks one of the most significant transformations of 
the United States federal government since the 1947 National Security Act.  Agencies 
assigned to the new department will analyze threats and intelligence, guard the country’s 
borders, monitor port facilities and airports, protect critical infrastructure, and coordinate 
the nation’s response to future contingencies. 
D.  INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
(IAIP) DIVISION 
DHS, through the Directorate of IAIP will merge under one roof the capability to 
identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland, those threats against our 
vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings and take preventive and protective action.31  On 14 
March 2003, the White House announced Paul Redmond, the former chief of 
counterintelligence at the CIA, as assistant secretary of homeland security for information 
analysis.32  Before Redmond’s selection John Gannon, former chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, headed the IAIP transition team.  The IAIP transition team 
consisted of approximately seven members.  John Gannon currently acts as Chief 
Intelligence Director for the new department.  The team is tasked with the challenge to 
create a new and effective intelligence organization to meet the needs of the new 
department.  “Actionable intelligence—that is, information which can lead to stopping or 
apprehending terrorists—is essential to the primary mission of DHS.”33  The IAIP will 
synthesize and disseminate information, provide intelligence analysis and alerts, develop 
plans to protect critical infrastructure, manage cyber security, provide indications and 
warning advisories, establish partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies, and 
provide coordination of the National Communications System (See Appendix C).  
                                                 
31 Quote from US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0094.xml.  
32 James Risen, “A Top Intelligence Post Goes to C.I.A. Officer In Spy Case,” New York Times, 13 
March 2003. 
33 US Department of Homeland Security Website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial_0094.xml.  
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Appendix C provides a detailed description of the tasks assigned to the IAIP as stated by 
the US Department of Homeland Security. 
E.  TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER 
In the January 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced a new 
initiative to better protect America by continuing to close the “seam” between analysis of 
foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.34  The new Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center (TTIC) will assess all-source intelligence gathered by the CIA, Justice 
Department, Pentagon, and DHS.  It will enable consolidated integration of the nation’s 
terrorist threat-related information and analysis.  On 11 March 2003, after consultation 
with the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland 
Security and Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, named John O. 
Brennan as Director of the newly created TTIC. 
The new center aims to remove information-sharing and analysis barriers between 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  The new TTIC has significant implications 
for the DHS.  “Homeland Security will be a full partner and an important customer” of 
the center, one senior administration official, said.35  The DHS will add critical new 
capabilities in the area of information analysis and infrastructure protection.36  Lines of 
authority between the two organizations appear confusing.  The center will consist of the 
counterterrorism expertise from the FBI, CIA, and other Defense Department agencies.  
TTIC proposals indicate DHS will be an important consumer of intelligence from the 
new center.  In testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 26 
February 2003, Homeland Security Deputy Secretary England said that Homeland 
Security would be a “partner” in the new center, but would act mainly as a consumer of 
the intelligence the new center produces.37   
                                                 
34 “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America,” Official White House News 
Release (28 January 2003).  Retrieved on 07 February 2003 from White House Official Website at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-12.html. 
35 Walter Pincus and Mike Allen, “Terrorism Agency Planned: Center to Integrate Intelligence, 
Analysis,” Washington Post, 29 January 2003, 12. 
36 “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America,” 3. 
37 Shane Harris, “Homeland Security Cedes Intelligence Role,” Government Executive Magazine, 26 
February 2003.  Retrieved from Government Executive Website on 28 February 2003 at: 
http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0203/022603h1.htm.  
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The current TTIC proposal does not clearly delineate operational responsibilities 
between TTIC and DHS.  CIA Director George Tenet will have oversight authority over 
the organization and will choose its head.38  However, the CIA traditional focuses on 
foreign intelligence.  The proposed TTIC will have the authority to set requirements and 
assign collection operations for all intelligence agencies.  DHS will have to coordinate 
collection operations of state and local law enforcement authorities.  In addition, DHS 
will be responsible for ensuring threat information, produced by DHS internally, or by 
the TTIC, disseminates in a timely fashion to the public, private industry, and state and 
local governments.  The center seems to parallel the intelligence analysis capabilities 
assigned to DHS in the Homeland Security Act.  Operational chains of commands appear 
to overlap between the two organizations.  TTIC proposals indicate some of the DHS 
functions be performed at the new facility housing the TTIC.39  In addition, senior 
terrorism analysts from DHS will work out of the TTIC facility.  How the intelligence 
analysis section of DHS effectively functions in coordination with the new TTIC remains 
unanswered.  A senior multi-agency team will finalize the details, design, and 
implementation strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.40 
F.  THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE PROPOSED DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
One area of concern for DHS is intelligence support.  As a consumer of 
intelligence, DHS will compete with other members of the national security community 
to ensure DHS meets its priority requirements.  Defining the role of intelligence in the 
DHS and creating appropriate solutions to address intelligence issues related to homeland 
security is no easy task.  Many challenges surround the role of intelligence in the newly 
established DHS such as DHS’ role in the Intelligence Community, establishing 
information-sharing networks, acquiring “raw intelligence”, incorporating open source 
information (OSINT), and internal analytical quality.  The information analysis element 
within DHS will have the responsibility for acquiring and reviewing information from the 
agencies of the Intelligence Community, from law enforcement agencies, state and local 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America,” 3. 
40 Ibid., 2. 
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government agencies, and unclassified publicly available information (OSINT) from 
books, periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, and other media. 
Through an evaluation of published proposals and first hand inputs obtained from 
civilian and military intelligence experts from intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
this thesis defines, evaluates, and advocates the role of intelligence within the newly 
established DHS.  The proposals and ideas in general circulation addressed in this thesis 
available span across federal, state, and local levels.  In addition, this thesis describes 
how DHS can accomplish the new role for intelligence and advocates solutions to the 
intelligence issues facing DHS policymakers.  Data collection incorporated expertise 
from federal agencies such as the CIA, FBI, US Navy, the Office of Homeland Security, 
and DEA.  State and local expertise included insight from groups such as the El Paso 
Intelligence Center and the Terrorist Early Warning (TEW) group in Los Angeles. 
1.  The New Domestic Intelligence Focus 
In the United States, intelligence historically focused foreign intelligence.  For 
example, during years of the Cold War, intelligence efforts sought to counter Soviet 
collection against the United States and its allies.  The Soviet Union expended significant 
resources on its own intelligence collection against the United States and its allies, even 
during World War II, when the Soviet Union was considered and ally.41  US intelligence 
did not have to focus on threats to American soil.  US political sensitivities reinforced the 
notion, preference to intelligence focused away from the homeland.42  Throughout the 
1990s, US intelligence agencies sought to redefine threats to the nation’s security.   
In addition, secrecy typically dominated US intelligence.  In a recent Rand Review 
article, Jeffrey Issacson and Kevin O’Connell point out, “It is not surprising that the 
legacy of US intelligence was to share as little as possible with potential collaborators, 
both inside and outside the government.”43  Superpower competition drove many in the 
intelligence community to feel little need share information broadly.  Dissemination of 
intelligence precluded US domestic agencies not directly involved in national security 
affairs.  This thesis does not look to analyze the failures of 11 September or place blame 
                                                 




on any agencies or individuals.  Before 11 September, the intelligence community 
primarily focused its interest overseas, paying little attention to links between home and 
abroad.  
The events of 11 September 2001 dictate the role of intelligence has changed.  
The role of intelligence must also take on a new domestic focus.  US departments and 
agencies long considered to be outside the national security arena—such as the US 
Treasury, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or the US Border Patrol—now 
play an important role in securing the homeland.44  More importantly, state and local 
governments play a role in homeland security.  The cop on the street will prove to 
provide valuable intelligence in conjunction with traditional intelligence agencies such as 
the CIA.  The cities will provide valuable intelligence.  State and local entities will not 
only benefit from disseminated intelligence, the will also provide important sources of 
intelligence.  The primary mission of the new DHS is to protect the nation against further 
terrorist attacks.  The role of intelligence in for the new department is two-fold: 1) a 
process for the intergovernmental coordination of agencies involved in homeland 
security, and 2) a tailored, all-source fusion product to support DHS decision-makers and 
homeland security operational units.  A new domestic role for intelligence is required to 
become an effective instrument of national power.  This new role for intelligence presents 
many challenges for the DHS.  Defining the role of intelligence is only the first step.  The 
next step is addressing how DHS can accomplish this new role for intelligence.  The DHS 
must address several intelligence issues.  For example, the DHS must establish an 
intelligence organization capable of producing and coordinating the dissemination of 
actionable intelligence to deter future terrorist attacks on American soil. 
Such is the ‘ground truth’ and current institutional status of the new Department 




                                                 
44 Ibid., 49. 
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III. ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION FOR THE NEW ROLE OF 
INTELLIGENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The new Department of Homeland Security represents a major reorganization of 
numerous agencies assigned with US homeland security responsibilities.  DHS aims to 
unify these agencies and their functions into one operational command tasked with 
defending the United States against domestic terrorist threats.  Presently, the federal 
government lacks a single institution dedicated to systematically analyzing all 
information, both classified and unclassified, on potential terrorist threats within the 
United States.  A major component of the new department will focus on monitoring, 
analyzing, and utilizing all-source intelligence about domestic threats to US national 
security.  Intelligence is critical for preventing future acts of terrorism against the United 
States.  The role of intelligence in the new DHS is two-fold: 1) a process for the 
intergovernmental coordination of agencies involved in homeland security, and 2) a 
tailored, all-source fusion product to support DHS decision-makers.  Numerous 
discussion groups, task forces, and research firms have generated proposals and 
recommendations addressing the role for DHS intelligence support.  Utilizing data 
collected from proposals and ideas in general circulation, and primary source material, 
this chapter describes some of the intelligence issues DHS officials need to address in 
order to accomplish the two-fold role of intelligence.   
1. Tapping into the ‘Ground Truth’ 
In order to uncover the ‘ground truth’ about DHS intelligence issues, research and 
data collection incorporated a multitude of primary and secondary sources.  Published 
reports from the Markle Foundation Task Force, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 
the Rand Corporation, the Congressional Research Service, the House Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Practice Group, highlight 
some of the intelligence issues for the new DHS.  More importantly, research 
incorporated primary source material obtained from national and regional conferences on 
homeland security, interviews with intelligence and law enforcement experts, and public 
22 
speeches given by officials from the Intelligence Community and the Office of Homeland 
Security (See Appendix D).  Appendix D is a detailed list of the national and regional 
conferences serving as primary source venues for this thesis.  These conferences provided 
a means to discuss the role of intelligence support in homeland security with experts from 
the intelligence and law enforcement communities.  Primary source data provided 
valuable personal insights from personnel involved with homeland security 
responsibilities at the federal, state, and local levels.  In addition, conference forums 
provided the opportunity to conduct interviews with civilian and military experts 
currently working on homeland security efforts.  Anecdotal analysis of typewritten “After 
Action Reports” provided the means to consolidate and process the first-hand knowledge 
obtained from conferences and interviews (See Appendix E for an example).  Appendix E 
provides a complete summary of the After Action report written on the 2002 Government 
Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security.  In addition, data collection 
incorporated inputs obtained from presentations by senior officials currently assigned to 
the Office of Homeland Security (See Appendix D).  Testimony from senior officials in 
the Intelligence Community and the Office of Homeland Security helped fuse together a 
complete picture of how DHS can provide intelligence support.  Appendix F provides a 
copy of the typewritten “After Action Report” from MGEN Bruce Lawlor’s45 
presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on 05 November 2002, entitled “The 
Future of Homeland Security”  (See Appendix F).   
Access to intelligence professional networks also provided valuable primary 
source material.  For example, the Naval Intelligence Professionals (NIP)46 organization 
provided the means to establish personal contacts and obtain first hand inputs from 
civilian and military intelligence and law enforcement professionals around the country.  
                                                 
45 MGEN Bruce Lawlor, Senior Director for Protection and Prevention, Office of Homeland Security, 
visited the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California, 04-05 November 2002.  He met with 
faculty and students to discuss the role of intelligence in the new Department of Homeland Security.  He 
also gave a brief to NPS faculty and students on 05 November 2002, entitled “The Future of Homeland 
Security.”   
46 “Founded in 1985, Naval Intelligence Professionals (NIP) is a nonprofit organization incorporated 
to enhance awareness of the mission and vital functions of the Naval Intelligence community, as well as to 
foster camaraderie among Naval Intelligence Professionals.  It is an association of active duty, retired and 
reserve officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians who serve or have served within the Naval Intelligence 
community, as well as those in certain other categories who qualify as a nonvoting Subscriber.”  Retrieved 
from NIP website on 25 February 2003 at: http://www.navintpro.org.   
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Fusing together, a diverse cross-section of all-source information helped uncover the 
‘ground truth’ of how intelligence can provide a process for intergovernmental agency 
coordination in homeland security intelligence and provide a quality, all-source fusion 
product to support DHS decision-makers.  
B. WHAT ARE THE INTELLIGENCE ISSUES? 
1. Setting Up an Internal Intelligence Organizational Structure 
The final version of the Homeland Security Act establishes a Directorate for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) to head DHS intelligence 
efforts.  Legislation envisions an intelligence entity focused on receiving and analyzing 
intelligence from other government agencies and using it to provide warning of terrorist 
attacks and for addressing vulnerabilities terrorists could exploit.47  In order to 
accomplish its assigned mission, the DHS must first develop an internal intelligence 
organizational structure.  The new Department of Homeland Security must create a new 
intelligence entity to pull together information and intelligence from a variety of sources 
focused on domestic threats.  The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in 
the Information Age48 published a report in October 2002 emphasizing the critical 
component to establishing a DHS intelligence entity.  “A successful domestic intelligence 
and information strategy should start with the way we organize our people to take 
advantage of innovation.”49  Traditional intelligence focused on threats abroad.  A sound 
domestic intelligence organizational structure is required for DHS mission 
accomplishment. 
Other intelligence professionals and experts also recommend first establishing a 
DHS’ intelligence organization.  Robert David Steele points out, “America lacks a 
theory, concepts and doctrine, and a structured approach to how we might train, equip, 
and organize homeland defense intelligence and related security capabilities that are—
from the beginning—both networked and largely voluntary.  A separate program is                                                  
47 Best, 2. 
48 On 7 October 2002 the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age 
published a report entitled “Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, offering specific 
recommendations on how the government can develop information collection and analysis capabilities 
while also protecting the civil liberties of American citizens.  The entire report can be found at: 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle_Full_Report.pdf.  Information on the Markle Foundation Task 
Force on National Security in the Information Age can be found at: http://www.markletaskforce.org/. 
49 Markle Task Force Report, 9. 
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needed within which to earmark federal funds and establish capabilities at federal, state 
and local levels that apply the new craft of intelligence.”50  Dr. Barry Zulauf51, liaison 
officer, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Division adds, “The House 
Homeland bill calls for a fusion center, as if stating the phrase in law could summon one 
‘out of the vast deep.’  Neither this bill, nor the Senate version puts any of the 
organizational, structural, legal, or technical machinery in place.”52  The new DHS will 
identify and assess current and future threats, inform the President, issue timely warnings 
and take or effect appropriate action.  The first step for DHS is to develop an effective 
intelligence organizational structure.  Ralph Norman Channell53, a retired US Navy 
Captain and a Vietnam Veteran with 26 years of experience in Joint and Naval 
Intelligence, states, “Creating a structure so that an array of organizations can generate or 
analyze valuable intelligence information and provide it to officials and operations 
officers who can put it to good use is a daunting enterprise.”54  The new DHS intelligence 
entity needs to ensure it provides timely and actionable intelligence to DHS 
policymakers.  In addition, the intelligence structure must coordinate the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of time critical intelligence between federal, state, and local 
agencies.  Channell adds, “The new department needs to ensure centralized command 
functions are established.  It would probably be useful to create a capability to monitor 
and report on every stage of the terrorist “cycle.”55  Setting up a new intelligence 
organizational structure is no easy task.  Ron Dick, former head of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and currently working for Computer Sciences 
                                                 
50 Robert David Steele, “Talking Points on Homeland Defense Intelligence,” Memorandum Prepared 
for Brent Scowcroft, 03 December 2001.  (Electronic Copy to Naval Intelligence Professionals 
Organization, 03 December 2002), Naval Intelligence Professionals On-Line Discussion Forum. 03 
December 2002.  Memorandum can also be retrieved from www.oss.net. 
51 Dr. Barry A. Zulauf, Liaison Officer, Intel Division of Drug Enforcement Administration.  Dr. 
Zulauf is also a naval intelligence officer reservist recently assigned to the faculty of the Joint Military 
Intelligence College (JMIC). 
52 Dr. Barry A. Zulauf, liaison officer of Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division, 
interview by author, 4 December 2002.  
53 “Ralph “Norm” Channell is a retired US Navy Captain and a Vietnam Veteran with 26 years of 
experience in Joint and Naval Intelligence.  He also served as a Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate 
School where he taught Joint Warfare and Intelligence for over a decade.”  Biographical information 
retrieved from Center for Contemporary Conflict website on 25 February 2003, at: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/aug02/homeland2.asp. 
54 Channell, 1. 
55 Channell, 1. 
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Corporation’s homeland security division, points out, “Any time you start up a new 
entity, even though you laid a good foundation, until you start to execute its mission, 
there’s always concerns as to how that’s going to work.”56    
2.  Managing the Intelligence Process 
Another challenge for DHS personnel is managing the intelligence process within 
the new department.  “We must ensure a smooth and complete transition of 
organizational effectiveness as we cannot afford to have the new Department of 
Homeland Security reinventing the wheel at this critical point,” warned Sen. Chuck 
Grassley, R-Iowa.57  He added, “We cannot allow agencies that are turning over parts of 
their former domains to be parochial in their approach to this new department.”58  DHS 
will not have its own collection assets.  The new department must ensure information 
from such agencies as the CIA and FBI is analyzed side-by –side with all other 
intelligence.  The information analysis element within DHS will have the responsibility 
for acquiring and reviewing information from the Intelligence Community, law 
enforcement agencies, state and local government agencies, and unclassified publicly 
available information (commonly referred to as open source information or “OSINT”) 
from books periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, and media.59  The new DHS intelligence 
entity must establish an internal intelligence process to request, collect, analyze, and 
disseminate actionable intelligence to agencies and personnel assigned homeland security 
responsibilities.  
Intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal discusses the components of the intelligence 
process.  In his book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Lowenthal writes, 
“Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are 
required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated; and the way in which 
certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.”60  The first step for DHS is 
to identify the new department’s intelligence requirements, or Essential Elements of 
                                                 
56 Brock N. Meeks, “A Chink in the Infrastructure Armor?  MSNBC News.  
www.msnbc.com/new/868116.asp?0cv=CB10, 06 February 2003, 5. 
57 Ibid, 5. 
58 Ibid, 5. 
59 Best, 2. 
60 Lowenthal,  8. 
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Information (EEI).  EEI provide a starting point for DHS analysts.  The EEI dictate what 
information is required for DHS senior officials to make real-time decisions.  The next 
step is to standardize procedures for intelligence collection.  DHS analysts can first 
collect EEIs from readily available classified and unclassified sources.  Current DHS 
legislation dictates the department will have to obtain some EEIs from other intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies.  The new DHS needs to ensure other agencies understand 
and carry out the department’s collection requirements.  The DHS intelligence process 
also needs to address analysis of raw and finished intelligence.  Lastly, the DHS must 
coordinate and consolidate dissemination of actionable intelligence to state and local 
public safety agencies and the private sector.  Traditionally, intelligence agencies focused 
on foreign intelligence collection.  The events of 11 September 2001 dictate terrorists can 
cause enormous damage by attacking the country’s critical infrastructure at home.  
Homeland Security requires a national effort to secure America.  At present, the United 
States has no central process or institution dedicated to analyzing all-source intelligence 
on potential terrorist threats within the country.  The new department should manage the 
domestic intelligence process.   
a. Defining DHS’ Role in the Intelligence Community 
Many key agencies will contribute valuable intelligence to homeland 
security efforts.  DHS will become a new member of the Intelligence Community.  
However, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) currently presides over the 
Intelligence Community.  DHS will have to define its role within the Intelligence 
Community.  Within the Intelligence Community, the DCI establishes priorities for 
collection (and to some extent for analysis), based in practice on inter-agency 
discussions.61  The Homeland Security Act dictates the new DHS department will 
become a member of the Intelligence Community.  DHS officials need to ensure the 
department’s intelligence collection and analysis requirements are met.  Although the FBI 
and CIA will not be included in the Department of Homeland Security, the new 
Department should be able to task these agencies and other members of the intelligence 
community to produce required analyses or raw data.  Officials and analysts at the 
Homeland Security Department, however, might find themselves at a disadvantage when 
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dealing with other intelligence agencies because the intelligence community often makes 
source protection a priority.62  The new department must devise ways to overcome 
classification barriers.  Classification barriers cannot preclude the dissemination of 
actionable intelligence to those on the “frontlines of homeland security” (state and local 
public safety agencies, private sector, etc.).  DHS intelligence personnel will also 
facilitate access to intelligence databases and other analytical resources.63  Supporting 
Intelligence Community responsibilities will require more personnel resources than 
currently envisioned for DHS, thereby detracting from the intended focus on analysis of 
terrorist attacks.64  The new DHS intelligence entity will have to balance a variety of 
tasks and responsibilities as a new member of the Intelligence Community.  Based on his 
years of experience in intelligence and law enforcement with the DEA, Dr. Barry Zulauf 
provides some personal insight.  Dr. Zulauf states,  “From where I sit, DHS will have a 
broad statutory set of authorities to vacuum up all kinds of information, including Law 
Enforcement information as well as National Foreign Intelligence, and next to NO 
capability to process it or to get it to the people who need it.”65  The new DHS will have 
to effectively manage its internal intelligence process and define its role within the 
Intelligence Community. 
b.   The Question of “Raw” Intelligence 
There has been some discussion in the media whether DHS will have 
access to “raw intelligence” or only to finished analytical products.66  The new 
department will not have its own collection assets.  Raw data, such as satellite imagery or 
signals intercepts, is useless without some analysis included.  Including source 
information with raw data represents classification issues.  For example, human 
intelligence (HUMINT) reporting is often very sensitive in nature.  However, DHS would 
require some assessment of the reliability of the source.  The new DHS intelligence 
division will have to address the danger of unauthorized disclosures, dissemination of 
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sensitive information, and protection of sources.  DHS analysts must develop a means to 
utilize raw intelligence without knowing some of the source details. 
3.   Information-Sharing 
Numerous reports, publications, and conferences highlight the importance of 
sharing information and intelligence between organizations and agencies assigned 
homeland security responsibilities.  Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth A. Luikart, United 
States Air Force67, air intelligence officer for the 165th Airlift Wing, Georgia Air 
National Guard, wrote, “The attacks in September 2001 suggest that inadequate 
information sharing between law enforcement and national intelligence agencies led to 
lost opportunities to thwart the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda.”68  One reason Al Qaeda 
caught America by surprise on 11 September was a failure to communicate.  The House 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security stated, “The failure of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) to provide adequate forewarning was affected by resource 
constraints and a series of questionable management decisions related to funding 
priorities.”69  Agencies involved with domestic security lacked an information-sharing 
network to exchange intelligence. 
The new department must develop a system to share intelligence among agencies 
at the federal, state, and local levels.  Information sharing is critical to homeland security.  
In a recent Rand Review article, Jeffrey Issacson, vice president and director of the 
National Security Research Division at RAND, and Kevin O’Connell, director of 
RAND’s Intelligence Policy Center, pointed out, “Better information sharing—both 
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within and beyond the U.S. government—is essential to combat a networked, global 
terrorist threat.”70  In October 2002, the Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age released a report describing the need to build an 
information-sharing network to connect federal, state, and local levels.  The report calls 
for “a networked information technology system that effectively shares information 
among local, state, regional, and federal agencies and the private sector, and sets forth a 
blueprint for how such a system can be established under a set of Presidential 
guidelines.”71  Other published reports advocate establishing an information-sharing 
network to coordinate the interaction between individuals and agencies tasked with 
homeland security missions.  Some highlighted the lack of current networking 
capabilities.  A Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report by James 
Jay Carafano pointed out, “There are, for example, insufficient information sharing and 
intelligence networks, or shared data bases that link federal, state, and local agencies.72  
In order to accomplish its stated mission the DHS must establish integrated information 
sharing systems.  Current systems are inadequate.  For example, a Department of Justice 
study group found that 22 percent of the cities it surveyed with populations over 250,000 
had not municipal-wide systems for sharing information.73   
a. Integrating the Front Lines 
A major contributor to the homeland security mission is those agencies 
working the “frontlines” of homeland security such as local police and firefighters.  
Information sharing systems need to include the integration of first responders into DHS 
intelligence.  State and local public safety agencies, and the private sector play a key role 
in domestic intelligence efforts.  The Markle Foundation Task Force report stated,  
Most of the real frontlines of homeland security are outside of 
Washington, D.C.  Likely terrorists are often encountered, and the targets 
they might attack are protected, by local officials—a cop hearing a 
complaint from a landlord, an airport official who hears about a plane 
some pilot trainee left on a runway, an FBI agent puzzled by an odd flight 
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school student in Arizona, or an emergency room resident trying to treat 
patients stricken by an unusual illness.74   
In a November 2002 presentation to students and faculty at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, MGEN Bruce Lawlor, Senior Director for 
Protection and Prevention, Office of Homeland Security, reiterated the location of the 
true front lines of DHS intelligence.  He stated,  
The true front line of homeland security intelligence and information 
collection lies with the cities themselves.  Police provide the security 
mechanism to detect terrorist activity in the cities.  Intelligence is in the 
communities.  An enormous piece to the Department Homeland Security 
is the creation of a state, local, and federal information-sharing network.75   
In a presentation given at the Government Symposium for Information 
Sharing and Homeland Security in August 2002, Dr. Steven Gale76, Director of the 
Center for Organizational Dynamics, provided an interesting analogy summarizing the 
level of information sharing needing to take place within the United States.  Dr. Gale 
stated, “When it comes to information sharing on homeland security the intelligence 
analyst must be connected to the railroad car conductor to the chemical producers and to 
the first responders.”77  Information sharing needs to be driven by clear cut objectives 
and existing capabilities, if not “we are merely swapping stories.”78  The new Department 
of Homeland Security must develop plans to connect organizations and agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels. 
b. No Easy Task 
In theory, establishing an information sharing system sounds simple, but 
in practice, numerous challenges exist.  For example, many local officials do not have 
security clearances or secure facilities to protect classified data.  Classification barriers 
present a difficult challenge for exchanging information between agencies.  Numerous 
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handling caveats and accesses for intelligence exist.  Many intelligence agencies share 
intelligence on a “need to know” basis.  Homeland Security requires sharing information 
on a “need to share” basis.  Another obstacle is funding.  President Bush and Congress 
resolved the issues over creating a Department of Homeland Security, but funding for 
new programs has not yet been resolved.  “The reason is that only 2 of the 13 
appropriations bills to provide money for the government’s departments and agencies 
have been enacted…The government is no operating under what is called a continuing 
resolution, which limits departments and agencies to spending at last year’s levels.”79  
How will all these different agencies share data in order to accomplish the homeland 
security mission? 
4.   The Use of Open Source Information (OSINT) 
Information from unclassified sources—books, pamphlets, Internet sources, 
television and radio programs—is arguably an important resource for gaining information 
about terrorist groups and the larger political movements with which they are 
associated.80  Traditionally intelligence focuses on the realm of secrecy.  More often, the 
intelligence community relies on classified information for intelligence analysis and 
assessments.  Views among intelligence agencies vary on the incorporation of open 
source information.  DCI George Tenet in prepared testimony for the Senate Government 
Affairs Committee on 27 June 2002, stated that, “In every possible case, we will provide 
intelligence at the lowest permissible level of classification, including sensitive, but 
unclassified.”81  As Director Tenet’s remarks indicate, all-source analysis typically 
overlooks open source information.   
Incorporating open source information will provide a valuable resource to the new 
DHS intelligence entity.  Robert David Steele, in his book On Intelligence—Spies and 
Secrecy in an Open World, points out the importance of incorporating open source 
information.  Mr. Steele emphasizes the need for,                                                   
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Emerging concepts and doctrine for a more open intelligence 
community—one that is fully connected to a larger national information 
community as well as to a global architecture for more deliberate 
information-sharing between governmental and non-governmental 
organizations across national and cultural boundaries.82   
Open source intelligence should not replace classified intelligence.  However, 
understanding the terrorist threat facing the United States does not lie in a “secret vault.”   
a. An Academic Example 
For example, publications from the found in the academia community 
provide credible open source information.  Students at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California can take a course on Islamic fundamentalism.  The course educates 
students on such topics as Islamic fundamentalist profiles, the causes of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and the strategic objectives of Islamic fundamentalist groups.  Course 
materials go beyond the contemporary publications one finds exploited by the news 
media.  Students review primary source material written by Islamic fundamentalists such 
as Ayatollah Khomeini and Osama bin Laden.  Analyzing the works of Islamic 
fundamentalists provides an example of utilizing credible open source information.  DHS 
officials must understand not all the answers to preventing future terrorist threats to the 
United States lie locked behind a secret vault.  The new DHS intelligence entity will have 
to integrate classified and unclassified intelligence.   
5.   Analytical Quality 
Aside from the disadvantage of diverting scarce talent from other 
agencies, a number of the specific needed skills may not exist in adequate 
supply in the federal government at all.  There is a particular shortage of 
people with both the needed analytical and data skills.  At a minimum, 
significant investment in training will be needed, training oriented to the 
analytic methods and challenges described above and the networked, 
decentralized approach to using these methods.83   
Information exchange between government agencies is only one issue for DHS.  
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) division will also provide 
the core of domestic intelligence analysis.  In a televised speech last year President Bush 
stated, “This new department will review intelligence and law enforcement information 
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from all agencies of government and produce a single daily picture of threats against our 
homeland.”84  At present, the federal government lacks an institution dedicated to 
analyzing systematically all information on domestic terrorist threats.  The new DHS 
must provide quality analysis of domestic intelligence to support protecting the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.  “Analysts will be responsible for imagining the worst and 
planning to counter it.”85  Jeffrey Issacson and Kevin O’Connell suggested, “The 
intelligence community needs to rebuild an analytical cadre of highly skilled and 
continuously retrained specialists who can integrate knowledge pertinent to 
counterterrorism gained from multiple data sources, professional disciplines, and social 
sectors.”86  The DHS needs to build a cadre of skilled intelligence analysts trained in 
focusing on domestic threats.  This cadre of DHS intelligence professionals must produce 
quality intelligence assessments and analyses to disseminate across federal, state, and 
local levels.  The Markle Foundation Task Force point out the problem is broader than 
just sharing information.   
It is the challenge of using information effectively, linking collection with 
sound and imaginative analysis derived from multiple perspectives, and 
employing cutting-edge technology to support end-users, from emergency 
responders to Presidents.  In other words, we need to mobilize information 
for the new era of national security we have entered…to take domestic 
intelligence seriously we must address the specifics of the analytical work 
that needs to be done.  To link analysis to action, we give some 
illustrations of how information can empower people in the field, while 
also recommending guidelines to protect American liberties, not just 
American lives.87   
Assessments and analyses produced by DHS intelligence analysts will influence 
the decision-making of numerous agencies.  Ensuring analytical quality among DHS 
intelligence professionals is critical to the nation’s homeland security effort.  In a recent 
Congressional Research Service report, Richard Best points out,  
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Along with obtaining intelligence reporting from other agencies, DHS 
intelligence personnel will also produce vulnerability assessments of key 
resources and infrastructure, identify priorities for protection by the DHS, 
other agencies of the federal government, state and local government 
agencies and authorities, the private sector and other entities.88   
DHS intelligence personnel reporting will influence a multitude of homeland security 
organizations. 
The primary focus of the new Department of Homeland Security is preventing 
future terrorist attacks on American soil.  DHS intelligence analysts will have to focus on 
predicting and deterring domestic threats.  The key test for the DHS will be the quality of 
the analytical product—whether terrorist groups can be identified and warning given of 
plans for attacks on the US.89  DHS personnel will not only be consumers of intelligence.  
They will have to assess multi-source intelligence, both classified and unclassified, in 
order to provide DHS policymakers with actionable intelligence.  According to Issacson 
and O’Connell, “US decision makers must be careful to understand that we can paralyze 
our efforts to secure the homeland by disseminating information that is ‘inactionable’ (or 
not useful), incomplete, or simply lacking in solid analysis.”90  In order to provide timely 
operational intelligence support to DHS policymakers, the new DHS intelligence entity 
requires quality analysis.   
Based on proposals and ideas in general circulation, and primary source material 
obtained from intelligence and law enforcement professionals, this chapter described 
some of the pressing intelligence issues for the new Department of Homeland Security.  
These issues highlight how the new department can accomplish the role defined for 
intelligence in DHS.  The next step is advocating solutions. 
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IV. SOLVING THE ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter described some of the major intelligence issues the new 
DHS officials to address in accomplishing the department’s new role for intelligence.  
Highlighting concepts and ideas in general circulation is only the first step.  This chapter 
advocates how the DHS can provide a process for intergovernmental agency intelligence 
coordination and produce actionable intelligence to deter future terrorist attacks against 
America at home. 
B. ORGANIZING THE DHS INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 
1. Military Intelligence Provides a Model 
Intelligence support will be critical to the new department’s ability to deter future 
terrorist threats.  The first step for DHS officials is creating an organizational structure 
for the new department’s intelligence division.  The US military’s intelligence 
organizational structure provides the best model for DHS officials to follow.  Ralph 
Channell points out, “The US military’s recent experience, especially in organizing for 
joint warfare, might be a place to turn for some lessons.”91  Other intelligence 
professionals reinforce why the military’s intelligence organizational structure is a good 
model to follow.  CAPT Tom Ward, a naval intelligence officer working on homeland 
security issues at the Joint Forces Command, pointed out, “The military intelligence 
community itself is not having difficulty implementing change to support homeland 
security.  Common practices and concepts are pretty much in place already.”92  MGEN 
Bruce Lawlor, Senior Director for Protection and Prevention, Office of Homeland 
Security, expressed similar sentiments in a November 2002 brief to faculty and students 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  MGEN Lawlor stated, “The 
main contribution the military can make to the DHS is helping to provide a security 
mindset that deals with doctrine, tactics, procedures, and skills needed for homeland 
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security.”93  He added, “The military thinks in security terms to guide planning.  The 
civilian sector is just not used to thinking in this paradigm.”94  Utilizing the military 
intelligence model would provide a foundation for the new department’s domestic 
intelligence construct. 
2.  Centralized Command Functions 
Another component for the department’s intelligence structure is developing a 
centralized command.  DHS officials should establish a headquarters near Washington, 
D.C. to coordinate the nation’s domestic intelligence effort.  A centralized headquarters 
would allow for collation and analysis of data provided from agencies or field offices 
dispersed throughout the United States.  In addition, the centralized headquarters would 
dictate policy guidelines for agencies and organizations at the federal, state, and local 
levels.  Without a centralized command, dispersed organizations will have no common 
standards or principles to dictate how the various agencies fit into the “big picture” of 
securing the homeland.  Distinct grassroots initiatives for conducting domestic 
intelligence will continue without a governing authority.  Without a centralized 
command, these disparate agencies, working as individual “stovepipes,” will fail to fuse 
together all-source intelligence.  Domestic intelligence collection, analysis and 
dissemination spans across federal, state, and local levels.  The country cannot afford to 
have individual agencies work in their own unique stovepipe.  A centralized command 
will coordinate the efforts of all those involved in homeland security intelligence.  DHS 
must take the lead in setting domestic information and intelligence priorities. 
3.  Decentralized Command Functions  
The new intelligence division must also create a balance of decentralized 
command functions.  The Markle Task Force Report pointed out, “The intelligence and 
other information critical to homeland security will come from across the country and 
around the world.  Washington, D.C., is a critical node in that network, but only one of 
many.”95  Information and intelligence sharing cannot only focus on the capital of the 
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country.  Domestic intelligence cannot only support DHS policymakers.  The new DHS 
intelligence agency will have to support the frontlines of homeland security.  Most of the 
people, information, and action will be in the field—in regional or local federal offices, in 
state, regional, and local governments, and in private firms.96  DHS officials must 
understand that states have their own sovereignty and capabilities.  The DHS intelligence 
entity must also address state-based capabilities. 
The new department should create regional intelligence centers throughout the 
country.  Regional intelligence centers create a link between DHS and state and local 
organizations.  These regional centers would create 24/7 all-source fusion cells to 
maintain intelligence preparation of the battle space for the entire country.  Homeland 
security deals with a multitude of issues requiring specialized expertise.  As 
intermediaries, regional intelligence centers would provide the ability to conduct 
specialty area analysis.  Different regions of the country focus on distinct homeland 
security issues.  Regional offices could establish specialized bureaus to deal with specific 
functional problems such as monitoring of shipping containers, chemical and biological 
defense, and tracking immigration activity.  Several grassroots initiatives demonstrate the 
infrastructure for regional intelligence centers is already in place.   
a. Terrorist Early Warning Working Group in Los Angeles 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department created a Terrorism Early 
Warning (TEW) group to connect law enforcement, fire, health, and emergency 
management agencies to circulate warnings, analyze possible dangers, check public 
health and epidemiological indicators, and manage possible consequences of a terrorism 
event.97  Through routine monthly meetings, the TEW group provides a simple forum to 
overcome interagency cooperation difficulties on homeland security issues.  The group 
has also developed methods to avoid classification barriers for sharing information.  For 
example, the group publishes a TEW OSINT report for agencies affiliated with the group.  
The TEW group emphasizes a “need to share” philosophy.  The group rewards 
information sharing.  TEW avoids having too many handling caveats and accesses for 
intelligence.  For more details on operating procedures of the TEW group, refer to 
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Appendix G.  Appendix G provides an After Action Report from the 26 September 2002, 
TEW group conference.  The report describes the TEW organization, conference agenda, 
and procedures.  Other regional intelligence centers should follow the TEW concept.  The 
new DHS will require information from various homeland security authorities ranging 
from law enforcement to state and local public safety to national foreign intelligence.  
Models like the TEW group provide an example of the regional intelligence 
infrastructure, already in place, for the new Department of Homeland Security to 
incorporate.   
b.   Addressing State-Based Capabilities 
The new DHS must incorporate doctrine, tactics, and procedures for 
developing state-based capabilities.  Robert David Steele explains the importance of 
creating state-based intelligence capabilities.  “Federal bureaucrats rarely understand the 
vital reality that states have their own sovereignty and that federal solutions are neither 
desired nor able to be implemented at the state level.  Needed instead is a systematic 
means for transferring the proven process of intelligence and counterintelligence down to 
the state level.98  He recommends three initiatives:  
1) A national training program for state-based intelligence and counter 
intelligence specialists, 2) the creation of 24/7 Community Intelligence 
Centers in each state (each subordinate to the Governor) utilizing federal 
funds and expertise, and 3) the appointment by each Governor of trusted 
senior State Intelligence Officers (SIO); some to oversee all state-based 
intelligence operations, and others to represent the Governor within the 
Homeland Defense Intelligence Center.  Mobilize all citizens as “watch 
standers.99   
The new intelligence organizational structure within DHS does not have to 
start from scratch.  Models currently exist for DHS officials to follow.  The DHS 
intelligence division must ensure a balance of centralized and decentralized command 
functions.  In addition, procedures must develop for addressing state-based capabilities.  
Establishing a sound intelligence structure within the new DHS creates the foundation for 
“unity of effort” and “economy of force” against domestic terrorist threats. 
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C. CREATING AN ALL-SOURCE FUSION CENTER 
One major component of the DHS intelligence division is the creation of an all-
source fusion center where DHS analysts can evaluate and assess intelligence 
information, both classified and unclassified, obtained from agencies involved in 
homeland security.  The lack of all-source intelligence contributed to the intelligence 
shortfalls that made the terrorist attacks of 11 September possible.100  The new DHS must 
become the hub for accumulating, and analyzing all-source domestic intelligence.  
Creating an all-source fusion center is not a new concept. 
1. Navy’s Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Model 
The US Navy, for example, ran a successful Ocean Surveillance Information 
System (OSIS) during the Cold War intended to monitor and track the threat posed by the 
Soviet Navy.  Functions of this system included monitoring long-term trends (e.g., new 
ship construction or doctrinal debates), fusion of multiple sources of information to track 
and analyze worldwide Soviet ship movements in near real time dissemination of useful 
information directly to US ships at sea.101  The Navy’s operational intelligence 
(OPINTEL) model provided the ability to take existing and missing evidence, link it to 
long-term trends and patterns, and make OPINTEL assessments regarding Soviet naval 
activity.  In order to prevent future domestic terrorist attacks DHS must create the ability 
to provide long-term trends and pattern analysis.  With the Navy’s OPINTEL model, “A 
global effort that unfolded over many months was thus required to provide real-time 
support to operational units.”102  The new DHS will require the ability to provide 
operational units around the country with actionable intelligence to deter terrorist activity.  
The Navy’s OSIS model provides an example for DHS to follow in creating an all-source 
fusion center. 
2.  El Paso Intelligence Center 
Another model for an all-source fusion center is the El Paso Intelligence Center.  
Dr. Barry Zulauf, DEA Intelligence Division liaison officer, provides a brief description 
of the El Paso Intelligence Center.  “The El Paso Intelligence Center performs its 
multiple database analysis on request and provides immediate actionable intelligence to                                                  
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first responders and emergency services people around the country 24/7.  The concept 
tracks with its ‘First Cousin’ the Navy OPINTEL model—designed to serve the operating 
forces.”103  The El Paso Intelligence Center coordinates the all-source fusion of 
intelligence provided by organizations and agencies in the El Paso, TX region.  The 
center provides the ability to take existing and missing evidence, link it to long-term 
trends and patterns, and timely assessments regarding homeland security issues.  The 
organization provides a current feed of domestic intelligence to its customers.  In order to 
prevent future domestic terrorist attacks DHS must create the ability to provide an 
intelligence product based on long-term trends and pattern analysis. 
3.   Army’s Information Dominance Center (IDC) 
The IDC is the research and development center for Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Total Information Awareness (TIA) program headed by Dr. 
John Poindexter.  The organization provides a prototype for total information awareness.  
Philosophically, IDC/TIA is similar in its approach and goals to the Navy’s OSIS.  In a 
recent interview, retired Navy Captain Joe Mazzafro summarized IDC’s capabilities.  He 
stated,  
IDC/TIA employs massive computing capacity in train with powerful data 
mining, fusion/correlation algorithms, analytical tools, and visualization 
technologies to do high volume at high-speed transactional analysis to 
provide all source situational awareness and predictive intelligence.  IDC’s 
goal is to provide analysts with fused all source near real time reports to 
complement current scheduled production reporting of the intelligence 
community.  IDC is clearly able to do nodal analysis on vast amounts of 
transactional events (phone calls, faxes, emails, etc.) and display the 
results in a meaningful way.104   
The IDC/TIA transformed the Navy’s OSIS model through application of 
information technology.  Mazzafro adds, “The IDC is not a linear extrapolation of OSIS, 
but rather its transformation through the IT revolution.”105  
The creation of an all-source fusion center for the new DHS is a critical 
component to ensuring DHS policymakers gain full situational awareness of domestic 
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threats to the United States.  The Navy’s OPINTEL model, the El Paso Intelligence 
Center, and the Army’s IDC provide examples of all-source intelligence fusion centers 
for the new DHS to follow.  Developing an all-source fusion center will help ensure DHS 
provides actionable intelligence to homeland security decision-makers and operational 
units. 
D.  INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS NOT SO TECHNICAL AFTER 
ALL 
A significant obstacle for the new DHS is coordinating information sharing 
between disparate agencies spanning across federal, state, and local levels.  Numerous 
proposals recommend the creation of technologically advanced information sharing 
systems, databases, and data mining techniques.  However, proposals and 
recommendations for sophisticated computer networks require time and money.  More 
importantly, they overlook a much simpler solution, personal networking.  Until DHS 
acquires appropriations and development for sophisticated databases and connectivity 
infrastructure, the new department should focus on knowledge management and 
establishing communities of practice.  Developing personal networking systems provides 
a solution to information sharing obstacles now. 
The new Department of Homeland Security is an extensive group of organizations 
and personnel with vastly varying homeland security expertise and responsibilities.  In 
today’s environment, there is significant overlap of mission and duplication of effort 
within and between organizations with homeland security responsibilities.  Since the 
tragedy of 11 September 2001, the new DHS has been fortunate in that is has seen a 
windfall of funding to support protecting the homeland.  However, as the attacks of 11 
September move farther into the past, the purse strings of Congress will begin to tighten 
again.  Into the future, the new DHS may receive more appropriations but the burgeoning 
coffers will fade.  Establishing a Homeland Security Community of Practice is an 
opportunity for DHS to organize and make real change that will make it viable, respected, 
and unmatched into the future.  The new DHS must find ways to prevent the duplication 
of effort, increase collaboration between organizations at the federal, state, and local 
levels and better manage the resources available in personnel.  One method DHS should 
implement to meet the demand for information-sharing across federal, state, and local 
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levels is to begin establishing communities of practice to coordinate DHS organizations, 
policies, and practices. 
1. What are Communities of Practice (CoPs)? 
Intelligence analysts working an intelligence problem may sometimes stop and 
think, “I know someone in organization X has dealt with this particular problem before I 
just don’t know who…?”  Communities of Practice provide the best means for enabling 
organizations to share knowledge community-wide.  An improved network of personal 
contacts and better results strengthen organizations.  Personnel benefit through peer-
group recognition and continuous learning. 
CoPs are groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion 
about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting 
on an ongoing basis.106  Although the term “Community of Practice” is relatively new, 
CoPs are not.  Such groups have been around since people in organizations realized they 
could benefit from sharing their knowledge, insights, and experiences with others who 
have similar interests or goals.  One of the best-known, early examples of a CoP is one 
formed by the copier repair technicians at Xerox Corporation.107  Through networking 
and sharing their experiences, particularly the problems they encountered and the 
solutions they devised, a core group of these technicians proved extremely effective in 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of efforts to diagnose and repair Xerox 
customers’ copy machines.  The impact on customer satisfaction and the business value 
to Xerox was invaluable.  Yet, for the most part, this was a voluntary, informal gathering 
and sharing of expertise, not a “corporate program.”  Because CoPs generate 
extraordinary learning, they are among the most important structures for any organization 
where thinking matters and information sharing is required for mission accomplishment, 
whether officially recognized by senior leadership or not. 
2.   Personal Networking Provides an Answer Now 
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In theory, establishing an information sharing system sounds simple, but in 
practice, numerous challenges confront DHS.  For example, many local officials do not 
have security clearances or secure facilities to protect classified data.  Many agencies 
disseminate information on a “need to know” basis.  Homeland Security information 
sharing requires a “need to share” philosophy.  Establishing personal contacts with 
various agencies provide a means to work around classification barriers. 
Database systems and computer-based networks provide long-term solutions to 
the information-sharing problem.  In addition, information sharing technology initiatives 
remain long term until due to funding constraints.  At the working level in the federal 
agencies in Washington, D.C., the problem of information and homeland security has 
been seen, first of all, as a problem of buying new technology.108  Sums are being spent 
to modernize each agency’s own information systems, some of it relevant to homeland 
security, almost none of this money is being spent to solve the problem of how to share 
this information and intelligence among those federal agencies.”109  Adequate 
appropriations to fund the development of new information systems do not seem to exist 
yet.  However, the terrorists will not wait until this infrastructure is in place.  Establishing 
a homeland security community of practice, building personal networks, and creating a 
liaison officer network provides solutions now.   
a.   Establish a Homeland Security Community of Practice 
The new DHS must devise an approach to ensure knowledge management.  
DHS policymakers should strongly consider the effects of applying communities of 
practice to the new DHS and its potential to contribute to domestic intelligence 
information sharing.  If the new DHS is to flourish and meet the increasing demands of 
homeland security as outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the new 
department must find short-term solutions to transform.  Terrorists will not stand by and 
wait until they new department develops the necessary components to protecting the 
homeland.  Numerous organizations have embraced knowledge management.  For 
example, the US Navy looks to be a front-runner in the implementation of knowledge 
management.  The naval intelligence community in particular is conducting research and 
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development for the creation of an intelligence skill set and experience database, co-
hosted with a collaborative environment such as threaded news groups.110 
Agencies involved with homeland security need to collaborate and 
exchange information and ideas.  A multitude of agencies from the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities will provide valuable intelligence for DHS analysts.  In order 
to conduct all-source analysis a good intelligence professional must establish a diverse 
network of personal contacts.  Bill Moffett, a retired intelligence officer with 28 years of 
service at the CIA, pointed out, “The best way to tap into intelligence produced by the 
CIA is through establishing personal contacts.”111  The key to gaining access to other 
intelligence agencies is personal networking.  DHS intelligence personnel should create 
communities of practice to build a cadre of homeland security expertise.  Inexpensive 
software programs can provide the means for DHS intelligence personnel to connect with 
personnel assigned homeland security responsibilities around the country.  In addition, 
DHS personnel should subscribe to various intelligence networking forums such as the 
Naval Intelligence Professionals and the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.  
Communities of Practice are working around the country.  The Terrorist Early Warning 
(TEW) working group in Los Angeles, discussed earlier in Chapter II, illustrates how 
personal networking can make a difference.  Based on a foundation of a personal 
networking database, the TEW is able to coordinate regional information sharing in a 
simple yet effective manner.  DHS analysts should establish a homeland security 
community of practice. 
b.   Establish a Liaison Network 
Establishing liaisons can also enhance personal networking for DHS 
personnel.  The DHS should not rely solely on computer-based information sharing 
systems.  Liaison with various intelligence (CIA, NSA, NORTHCOM) and law 
enforcement (FBI, chiefs of police) agencies will be required.  In addition, liaison with 
state, city, and other local officials will be crucial because these officials have the 
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resources needed to act on warnings issued by the Homeland Security Department.112  
Local officials play a key role in homeland security because they reside on the front lines.  
In addition, they have the ability to detect specific evidence of terrorist activity that is 
often uncovered in traffic stops, citizen reports of strange activity or people, or local 
arrests.113  An established information sharing system provides the means for these 
reports to reach national level organizations.  In turn, as national organizations receive 
local reporting then can combine it with multiple source intelligence to create the correct 
“big picture.”  Personal networking and establishing communities of practice is the short-
term solution to ensuring homeland security information sharing. 
E. UTILIZING OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) 
Information from open sources such as books, pamphlets, journals, and Internet 
sources is an important resource for gaining intelligence about terrorist groups and their 
intended political agendas.  Intelligence agencies often overlook incorporating OSINT.  
Traditional intelligence tradecraft typically did not fuse OSINT with other types of 
classified intelligence such as imagery intelligence (IMINT) or signal intelligence 
(SIGINT).  The new DHS will have to incorporate tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
collect and analyze OSINT.  Robert David Steele is his book On Intelligence: Spies and 
Secrecy in an Open World, writes,  
Analysts should be able to use classified information to inform themselves 
and validate their views, but they should focus production efforts on the 
unclassified side, providing information that can not only go to the 
individual government consumers, but which can also go into the public 
domain through the open architecture.114   
Homeland security responsibilities span across a wide spectrum of federal, state, and 
local levels.  Domestic intelligence cannot rely solely on classified information.  Not all 
personnel assigned with homeland security responsibilities will have security clearances.  
Classification systems used by agencies such as the CIA or NSA does not apply to the 
“cop on the beat.”  Utilizing open source information provides a means to avoid 
classification barriers. 
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Secret intelligence alone cannot protect America’s homeland.  All parts of 
government, federal, state, and local provide valuable intelligence to safeguard the United 
States.  Homeland security requires a new tradecraft of intelligence, incorporating open 
source information.  In his book The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and 
Political, Robert David Steele provides a recommendation for incorporating open source 
information.  “Before pattern analysis can be useful, a global open source benchmarking 
endeavor is needed across all countries and topics.  Essentially, the art and science of 
pattern analysis from signals intelligence must now be brought over to the open source 
world, both in print and broadcast media monitoring.”115  DHS must undertake 
procedures to collect and analyze OSINT.  The United States today faces “non-traditional 
threats from cultural traditions that we do not understand very well—such as terrorism 
rooted in extremist Islamic groups.”116  Many of the keys to unlocking the answers to 
these non-traditional threats lie in the unclassified realm of web-based exchanges, not 
secret or top-secret databases.  The new DHS must tap into existing open sources such 
journals, domestic and foreign news services, and most importantly the Internet.  
Individuals and agencies assigned with homeland security responsibilities should have an 
unclassified channel for exchanging domestic intelligence.  In today’s technological 
advanced world, open source information is at an analyst’s fingertips.  The question is 
whether DHS intelligence analysts incorporate OSINT into their all-source fusion of 
intelligence. 
F.  SETTING A PLACE AT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S TABLE 
The new Department of Homeland Security should manage the domestic 
intelligence process.  Although the FBI and CIA will not be included in the Department 
of Homeland Security, the new Department should be able to task these agencies and 
other members of the intelligence community to produce required analyses or raw data.  
Officials and analysts at the Homeland Security Department, however, might find 
themselves at a disadvantage when dealing with other intelligence agencies because the 
intelligence community often makes source protection a priority.117   
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The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) provides a 
model for creating a balance between providing intelligence input to support the 
policymaking process and providing accurate intelligence analysis of the threat.  Most 
observers credit INR with having performed responsibly over the years.118  Being a 
component of the Intelligence Community has allowed INR to have direct and close 
access to intelligence data and analysis as well as to influence the establishment of 
collection and analysis priorities.119  Legislation does not provide the new department 
with its own collection assets.  DHS intelligence will come from a variety of agencies.  
The management of the intelligence process is crucial, especially the establishment of a 
secure information system to support databases and the rapid exchange of information.  
Close liaison with, and the ability to task the intelligence community, especially the CIA, 
NSA, and the FBI, is required.120  The Markle Report reemphasizes the need for the new 
DHS to drive domestic intelligence collection.  The report stated, 
The DHS should be the lead agency for shaping domestic intelligence 
products to inform policymakers, especially on the analytical side, so that 
there is some separation between the attitudes and priorities of intelligence 
analysis and the different, more concentrated, focus of law enforcement 
personnel authorized to use force on the street to make arrests and pursue 
or detain citizens.121   
G.  ENSURE ANALYTICAL QUALITY 
Despite rhetoric that DHS will be a consumer of intelligence from other agencies, 
the new department still requires skilled intelligence analysts.  Ralph Norman Channell 
points out, “The new department needs analysts and managers in both headquarters and 
field offices and liaison officers serving with other intelligence agencies.”122  DHS 
intelligence personnel will have to analyze and assess information received from other 
sources before turned over to DHS policymakers.  Quality analysis does not currently 
exist within the new DHS.  A recent report by Richard Best, Specialist in National 
Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division points out, “The types of 
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information that have to be analyzed come from disparate sources and require a variety of 
analytical skills that are not in plentiful supply.”123  For example, analysts will require 
training on foreign environments from which terrorist groups emerge.  In addition, 
combining personnel from other agencies requires coordinating different cultures and 
paradigms.  Personnel from other agencies will require analytical training on DHS 
intelligence requirements.  In a Rand Review article Jeffrey Issacson and Kevin 
O’Connell summarize,  
Analyzing terrorism is not like analyzing Russian naval strength or Latin 
American political systems; such analyses rely upon well-defined 
indicators and data sources.  In contrast, counter terrorism analysis must 
provide structure to information that can be highly fragmentary, lacking in 
well-defined links, and fraught with deception.  It must infer specific 
strategies and plans from small pieces of information.  It must find 
common threads among seemingly disparate strands.  And unlike the 
terrorist, who needs only a single vulnerability to exploit, the analyst must 
consider all potential vulnerabilities.124   
The DHS must ensure the development of analytical quality within the new 
department.  As a consumer, DHS still requires a cadre of skilled analysts to conduct its 
own internal intelligence analyses and assessments.  DHS intelligence analysts will have 
to work with other relevant agencies to map and prioritize critical infrastructure within 
the United States.  The capability to analyze the vulnerability of potential targets and the 
means used to attack critical infrastructure must reside in one place.  This is why it is so 
essential that the intelligence and critical infrastructure protection both be placed under 
the DHS’s Undersecretary for Intelligence.125  Ensuring analytical quality is vital to DHS 
mission accomplishment.  However, the primary function of the new department is not 
intelligence.  This creates a problem for anyone involved in intelligence analysis within 
DHS.  Quality intelligence analysts become prime candidates for recruitment by the CIA 
or other intelligence agencies.  As a result, intelligence analysis in the new department 
becomes a collateral duty, in turn leading to second-class analysts.  No current 
organization within the United States is currently exceptional at solely domestic 
intelligence.  The FBI maintains a collective and investigative culture for developing                                                  
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material for prosecuting purposes.  The CIA focuses its intelligence efforts on foreign 
threats.  The new DHS intelligence should take the lead in domestic intelligence efforts.  
Doing so requires a cadre of skilled intelligence analysts.  DHS officials must ensure 
quality domestic intelligence analysis capabilities exist within the new department. 
1. Manning 
Recent reports indicate the department’s intelligence division may face analyst-
manning issues.  One member of the new department’s transition team stated, “This vital 
division will be ‘way behind the power curve in the intelligence game’ and forced to 
make do with a patchwork of temporary workers on loan from various agencies drawn 
from civilian contractors.”126  For example, the bulk of Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) personnel will come from an existing FBI unit, the 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC).  However, the law creating the 
Homeland Security Department does not mandate FBI agents working for NIPC 
voluntarily give up their jobs in the bureau.127  NIPC controls the Key Asset Initiative, a 
program staffed by 216 field agents whom identify potential threats to US critical 
infrastructure.  However, Commander David Wray, a Naval Reserve officer called back 
to active duty and working as spokesman for NIPC, pointed out, “Those [Key Asset 
Initiative] functions, under law, transfer with NIPC but those FBI agents in the field will 
not transfer to Homeland Security.”128  In the initial stages, the new DHS will begin with 
analysts detailed from existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  In addition to 
analysts from the FBI’s NIPC, a small number of analysts from the Department of 
Commerce, the National Communications System, the Department of Energy, the 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center and the General Services 
Administration, will augment the Homeland Security Department’s intelligence 
branch.129   
 
2. Training 
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Ensuring analytical quality within the new department requires development and 
investment in training.  The Markle Task Force points out,  
Aside from the disadvantage of diverting scarce talent from other 
agencies, a number of the specific needed skills may not exist in adequate 
supply in the federal government at all.  There is a particular shortage of 
people with both the needed analytical and data skills.  At a minimum, 
significant investment in training will be needed, training oriented to the 
analytic methods and challenges described above and the networked, 
decentralized approach to using these methods.130   
The new DHS needs to create a national program for training domestic 
intelligence analysts.  Analysts within the new department will not be the only ones 
requiring adequate training.  Intelligence specialist training needs to extend across 
federal, state, and local levels. 
Intelligence support is a key area of concern for the new DHS.  Within the new 
department, the role of intelligence is two-fold: 1) provide a process for the 
intergovernmental coordination of exchanging domestic intelligence, and 2) the 
production of tailored all-source intelligence analysis to support homeland security 
decision-makers and operational units.  This chapter advocated recommendations and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. DEFINING THE NEW ROLE FOR INTELLIGENCE 
The creation of the new Department of Homeland Security represents one of the 
most significant changes in the federal government since the 1947 National Security Act.  
The new department aims to organize over 170,000 personnel spanning 22 previously 
disparate agencies into a unified operational structure capable of defending American 
citizens and their infrastructure against domestic terrorists threats.  DHS officials face 
numerous challenges in creating a new homeland security apparatus.  How can DHS 
prevent future attacks against America at home?  Intelligence provides part of the answer.  
A critical component of the new department will be devoted to monitoring, analyzing, 
and utilizing intelligence pertaining to potential threats against the US homeland.  DHS 
legislation proposes an analytical element within DHS with the capability to draw upon 
all the information gathering resources of federal, state, and local agencies.   
This thesis defined ‘Intelligence’ as the process and product by which 
information, both classified and unclassified, is collected and analyzed to provide policy 
makers with tailored-decision support on national security issues.  The role of 
intelligence for the proposed Department of Homeland Security is two-fold: 1) a process 
for the intergovernmental coordination of agencies involved in homeland security, and 2) 
a tailored, all-source fusion product to support DHS decision-makers and homeland 
security operational units. 
Various publications and ideas in general circulation describe how to accomplish 
the new the role of intelligence within DHS.  The success of the new DHS intelligence 
analysis element largely depends on addressing DHS intelligence organizational 
structure, managing the domestic intelligence process, creating an information network 
between federal, state and local agencies, and ensuring analytical quality.  This thesis 
outlines some of the major intelligence issues for the new DHS.  It by no means is all-
inclusive.  For example, DHS will have to address other issues such as striking a balance 
between privacy and security or developing new policies for federal counterintelligence.  
However, based on the primary and secondary source material collected for this thesis, 
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setting up DHS intelligence structure, managing the domestic intelligence process, 
sharing information, ensuring internal analytical quality, and incorporating open source 
information, represent the most important issues requiring immediate solutions.  
Organizational “growing pains” exist with the creation of any new agency.  A great naval 
officer, John Paul Jones, in engagement between the Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis, 
once said, “I have not yet begun to fight.”131  March 1, 2003, marked the date when most 
of the 22 disparate agencies officially moved into the new Department of Homeland 
Security.  That date marked only the beginning for the new department.  DHS personnel 
currently engage in the process of mobilizing an effective internal intelligence 
organization.  The new department is just beginning its fight to prevent future attacks 
against the American homeland.  Intelligence will play a pivotal role in the new DHS.  
The new DHS faces many challenges.  Solving the intelligence issues described in this 
thesis will allow the new Department of Homeland Security and its intelligence division 
to accomplish its assigned mission, protecting the American homeland.   
B. KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR DHS OFFICIALS 
The following is a list of recommended solutions for DHS policymakers. 
1. The Military Intelligence Model is a Good Place to Start 
Develop an intelligence organizational structure based on military intelligence.  
Create a centralized command structure capable of collecting and utilizing all-source 
intelligence.  In addition, the new department needs to ensure a decentralized information 
sharing system is in place to disseminate raw intelligence and analyses to first responders 
on the frontlines of homeland defense.  The success of military intelligence in joint 
warfare provides a model for DHS officials.  The military’s intelligence model has a 
history of success in providing all-source intelligence to support operational units.  The 
main contribution the military can make to DHS is providing a security mindset that deals 
with doctrine, tactics, procedures, and required skill-set for homeland security.  For 
example, the Navy’s Ocean Surveillance System during the Cold War effectively utilized 
all-source intelligence to monitor Soviet Navy activity.  The naval intelligence 
community demonstrated a mastery of operational intelligence (OPINTEL) support.  The 
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new DHS intelligence entity will require the ability to provide timely OPINTEL to DHS 
policymakers and homeland security operational units. 
2. Don’t Forget OSINT 
DHS intelligence analysts cannot rely solely on classified information from other 
agencies.  Analysts cannot afford to disregard or discredit OSINT.  DHS intelligence 
assessments must incorporate OSINT.  Understanding the philosophy and strategic 
objectives of potential threats posed by the likes of Islamic fundamentalist groups do not 
lie inside “secret vaults.”  Open source information provides a valuable piece of the DHS 
intelligence “big picture.”  
3. Establish a “Personal” Information Sharing System Now 
The DHS intelligence entity will require coordination between federal, state, and 
local agencies.  State and local agencies need to know there is no “green door” to the 
intelligence community in Washington D.C.  DHS must develop an intelligence 
information sharing system that harnesses the effort of the entire country.  In the short-
term, the department’s intelligence personnel should strive to build and rely on personal 
networking.  Establishing a Homeland Security Community of Practice will create an 
epistemic community of expertise focused on domestic intelligence.  Through an 
informal and unclassified personal networking system, DHS intelligence analysts can 
conduct all-source fusion of intelligence spanning across federal, state, and local levels.  
Developing close liaison with national intelligence agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and 
NORTHCOM is also required.  In addition, DHS personnel should establish a liaison 
network with state and local authorities, and organizations overseas.  The long-term 
establishment of secure information sharing networks and technologically enhanced data 
basing and data mining systems will be a critical factor in the new department’s mission 
success.  However, these advanced systems require resources and appropriations not 
currently available.  The short-term solution to information sharing resides with 
establishing personal networks or communities of practice. 
4. Ensure Analytical Quality 
One of the most controversial issues is analytical quality.  Legislation for the new 
department indicates DHS is primarily a consumer of intelligence.  In testimony before 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 26 February 2003, Homeland Security 
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Deputy Secretary Gordon England said the new department would not have its own 
intelligence analysis group, even though the law establishing the department gives it 
broad authority to receive and analyze information form across the government in order 
to protect the nation from terrorist attacks.132  However, the findings presented here 
indicate otherwise.  The new DHS intelligence entity will require a cadre of skilled 
intelligence analysts.  DHS personnel will have to sort through vast amounts of 
information, both classified and unclassified, and produce timely intelligence assessments 
to support DHS policymakers.  Assessments and analyses from other agencies will have 
to match with analysis of critical infrastructure.  Threat analysis and target vulnerability 
assessments will have to fuse together in order to inform DHS decision makers and 
homeland security operational units.  With multiple agencies such as the CIA, FBI, NSA, 
and NORTHCOM, providing all-source intelligence, DHS personnel assigned to the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) division will require enhanced 
analytical quality.  The new DHS must recruit and develop a cadre of skilled intelligence 
analysts.  DHS policy and resource allocation must emphasize the importance of DHS 
analyst recruitment.  The department’s intelligence analyst positions are not collateral 
duties.  If viewed as a collateral duty, second-class DHS intelligence analysts will result.  
The country will be no safer. 
C. TO KNOW THE ENEMY IS TO KNOW ONESELF 
In the words of the great strategist Sun Tzu, “Know the enemy and know 
yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”133  DHS officials must 
understand and create the necessary components within the new Department of 
Homeland Security.  Intelligence—timely, accurate and useful information about threats 
that can be used by police or military units to stop terrorist incidents before they occur—
is the basis of any successful effort to combat the threat of domestic terrorism.134  In the 
new department, intelligence must play a proactive and focused role in detection and 
deterrence.  Knowing the enemy starts with knowing yourself.  In order to deter future 
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terrorists threats to Americans, their infrastructure, and most importantly their way of 
life, DHS policymakers must clearly define the role of intelligence and address the 
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VI. PROLOGUE 
A. REAL WORLD APPLICATION 
A concise application of theory to real world problems leads to mission success.  
This thesis examined the role of intelligence in the new Department of Homeland 
Security and the intelligence issues DHS policymakers need to address in order to create 
an organization to deter future terrorists attacks on US soil.  Research for this thesis 
tapped into a variety of primary and secondary sources.  Unquestionably, intelligence will 
play a critical role in the new Department of Homeland Security.  The research and 
analysis presented in this thesis aims to serve more than just DHS policymakers.  This 
thesis serves a second purpose, supporting the education of federal, state, and local 
government officials (civilian and military) with homeland security responsibilities. 
B. SUPPORTING A NEW HOMELAND SECURITY MASTER’S PROGRAM 
On 06 January 2003, the Naval Postgraduate School, in conjunction with the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department, started the first master’s 
program to study homeland defense and security.  The Homeland Security curriculum 
came about in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and President Bush’s 
demand to build a homeland security effort.  Homeland security officials need to develop 
a cadre of people who can develop a preventive homeland security plan.  The program 
covers a wide range of subjects related to terrorism, security, and civil-military 
relations.135  The purpose of the program is three-fold: 1) prepare local and state leaders 
for future Homeland Security challenges, 2) equip leaders with the specialized knowledge 
and skills they will need, and 3) promote and build interagency cooperation at the local, 
State, and Federal levels.136  Students and faculty at the from the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s national security affairs, computer security, operations research, and 
international affairs curricula designed the courses for the new Homeland Security 
Curriculum.  One of the core-courses for the new Homeland Security Curriculum is 
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NS4156 “Intelligence Support to Homeland Security.”  The research and findings of this 
thesis provide a foundation for the new course.  The new course on intelligence will 
incorporate the source material, issues, and conclusions presented in this thesis.  The 
course design aims to shape and sharpen the intelligence and intelligence processes 
needed to support homeland security across federal, state, and local levels.  For more 
information on the new Homeland Security master’s program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School go to the Homeland Security Leadership Development website at www.hsld.org.   
Conducting research as a graduate school student helped uncover some of the 
‘ground truth’ about homeland security and the role intelligence should play.  
Incorporating the findings of this thesis into a new intelligence course for Homeland 
Security Curriculum students at the Naval Postgraduate School will help arm leaders in 
America’s homeland security effort.  The course hopes to provide personnel assigned 
with homeland security responsibilities the necessary intelligence problem-solving skills, 
along with “new” insights on intelligence, and “new” approaches to respond to the 




APPENDIX A.  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
REORGANIZATION PLAN, 25 NOVEMBER 2002 
 





This Reorganization Plan is submitted pursuant to Section 1502 of the 
Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which requires submission, 
not later than 60 days after enactment, of a reorganization plan regarding two categories 
of information concerning plans for the Department of Homeland Security (“the 
Department” or “DHS”): 
 
(1) The transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, and obligations to the Department 
pursuant to this Act. 
 
(2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of agencies transferred to 
the Department pursuant to this Act.  Section 1502(a). 
 
Section 1502(b) of the Act identifies six elements, together with other elements 
“as the President deems appropriate,” as among those for discussion in the plan.  Each of 
the elements set out in the statute is identified verbatim below, followed by a discussion 
of current plans with respect to that element. 
 
This plan is subject to modification pursuant to Section 1502(d) of the Act, which 
provides that on the basis of consultations with appropriate congressional committees the 
President may modify or revise any part of the plan until that part of the plan becomes 
effective.  Additional details concerning the process for establishing the Department will 
become available in the coming weeks and months, and the President will work closely 




(1) Identification of any functions of agencies transferred to the Department 
pursuant to this Act that will not be transferred to the Department under the plan. 
 
Except as otherwise directed in the Act, all functions of agencies that are to be 
transferred to the Department pursuant to the Act will be transferred to the 
Department under the plan.  The functions of agencies being transferred to the 
Department which the Act directs are not to be transferred are the following: 
 
• Pursuant to Section 201(g)(1) of the Act, the Computer Investigations 
and Operations Section (“CIOS”) of the National Infrastructure Protection 
60 
Center (“NIPC”) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) will not 
transfer to the Department with the rest of NIPC.  CIOS is the FBI 
headquarters entity responsible for managing all FBI computer intrusion 
field office cases (whether law enforcement or national security related). 
 
• Pursuant to Sections 421(c) & (d) of the Act, the regulatory 
responsibilities and quarantine activities relating to agricultural import and 
entry inspection activities of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“the USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) 
will remain with the USDA, as will the Secretary of Agriculture’s 
authority to issue regulations, policies, and procedures regarding the 
functions transferred pursuant to Sections 421(a) & (b) of the Act. 
 
• Pursuant to Subtitle B of Title IV of the Act, the authorities of the 
Secretary of the Treasury related to Customs revenue functions, as defined 
in the statute, will not transfer to the Department. 
 
• Functions under the immigration laws of the United States with respect 
to the care of unaccompanied alien children will not transfer from the 
Department of Justice to DHS, but will instead transfer to the Department 
of Health and Human Services pursuant to Section 462 of the Act. 
 
(2) Specification of the steps to be taken by the Secretary to organize the 
Department, including the delegation or assignment of functions transferred to the 
Department among officers of the Department in order to permit the Department to 
carry out the functions transferred under the plan. 
 
A. Steps to be taken by the Secretary to organize the Department.  The President 
intends that the Secretary will carry out the following actions on the dates 
specified.  All of the following transfers shall be deemed to be made to DHS, and 
all offices and positions to be established and all officers and officials to be 
appointed or named shall be deemed to be established, appointed, or named 
within DHS. 
 
January 24, 2003 (effective date of the Act pursuant to Section 4): 
 
• Establish the Office of the Secretary. 
• Begin to appoint, upon confirmation by the Senate, or transfer 
pursuant to the transfer provisions of the Act, as many of the 
following officers as may be possible: 
(1) Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
(2) Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection 
(3) Under Secretary for Science and Technology 
(4) Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security 
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(5) Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and 
Response 
(6) Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 
Services 
(7) Under Secretary for Management 
(8) Not more than 12 Assistant Secretaries 
(9) General Counsel 
(10) Inspector General 
(11) Commissioner of Customs 
 
• Name, as soon as may be possible, officers to fill the following offices 
created by the Act: 
 
(1) Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis 
(2) Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection 
(3) Privacy Officer 
(4) Director of the Secret Service 
(5) Chief Information Officer 
(6) Chief Human Capital Officer 
(7) Chief Financial Officer 
(8) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
(9) Director of Shared Services 
(10) Citizenship and Immigration Ombudsman 
(11) Director of the Homeland Security Advanced 
Research Projects Agency 
 
• Establish, within the Office of the Secretary, the Office for State and 
Local Government Coordination, the Office of International Affairs, and 
the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. 
 
• Establish the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 
and the Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland 
Security Technologies. 
 
• Establish within the Directorate of Science and Technology the Office 
for National Laboratories. 
 
• Establish the Bureau of Border Security, the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, and the Director of Shared Services. 
 
• Establish the Transportation Security Oversight Board with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security as its Chair. 
 
March 1, 2003: 
• Transfer the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (“CIAO”) of the 
Department of Commerce, the National Communications System (“the 
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NCS”), the NIPC of the FBI (other than the CIOS), the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (“NISAC”), the Energy 
Assurance Office (“EAO”) of the Department of Energy, and the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center of the General Services 
Administration (“FedCIRC”) 
 
• Transfer the Coast Guard. 
 
• Transfer the Customs Service, the Transportation Security 
Administration (“the TSA”), functions of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“the INS”), the Federal Protective Service (“the 
FPS”), the Office of Domestic Preparedness (“the ODP”), and the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center (“the FLETC”). 
 
• Transfer the functions of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to 
agricultural import and entry inspection activities under the laws specified 
in Section 421(b) of the Act from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service. 
 
• Transfer the United States Secret Service. 
 
• Transfer the following programs and activities to the Directorate of 
Science and Technology: 
• The chemical and biological national security and 
supporting programs and activities of the nonproliferation 
and verification research and development program of the 
Department of Energy. 
• The life sciences activities related to microbial pathogens 
of the Biological and Environmental Research Program of 
the Department of Energy. 
• The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center of the 
Department of Defense. 
• The nuclear smuggling programs and activities within the 
proliferation detection program of the nonproliferation and 
verification research and development program of the 
Department of Energy. 
• The nuclear assessment program and activities of the 
assessment, detection, and cooperation program of the 
international materials protection and cooperation program 
of the Department of Energy and the advanced scientific 
computing research program and activities at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory of the Department of 
Energy. 
• The Environmental Measurements Laboratory of the 
Department of Energy. 
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• Transfer the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”). 
 
• Transfer the Integrated Hazard Information System of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which shall be renamed 
“FIRESTAT.” 
 
• Transfer the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the FBI, 
including the functions of the Attorney General relating thereto. 
 
• Transfer the Domestic Emergency Support Team of the Department of 
Justice, including the functions of the Attorney General relating thereto. 
 
• Transfer the Metropolitan Medical Response System of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, including the functions of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services and Assistant Secretary for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness relating thereto. 
 
• Transfer the National Disaster Medical System of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, including the functions of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services and Assistant Secretary for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness relating thereto. 
 
• Transfer the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Strategic 
National Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
including the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
and Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
relating thereto. 
 
• Transfer to the Secretary the authority (in connection with an actual or 
threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency in the 
United States) to direct the Nuclear Incident Response Team of the 
Department of Energy to operate as an organizational unit. 
 
June 1, 2003: 
• Transfer the Plum Island Animal Disease Center of USDA. 
 
• Establish the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory 
Committee. 
 
By September 30, 2003: 
• Complete any incidental transfers, pursuant to Section 1516 of the Act, 
of personnel, assets, and liabilities held, used, arising from, available, or to 




B. Delegation or Assignment Among Officers of Functions Transferred to the 
Department.  The President intends that the Secretary will delegate or assign transferred 
functions within the Department as follows: 
 
1. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
 
a. Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(“IA and IP”): Will be responsible for oversight of functions of NIPC, 
NCS, CIAO, NISAC, EAO, and FedCIRC transferred by the Act, the 
management of the Directorate’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection duties, and the administration of the Homeland Security 
Advisory System. 
 
b. Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis: Will oversee the 
following Information Analysis functions: 
 
• Identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the 
homeland; detect and identify threats of terrorism against the 
United States; and, understand such threats in light of actual and 
potential vulnerabilities of the homeland. 
 
• In coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
Protection, integrate relevant information, analyses, and 
vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or 
assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) 
in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures 
by the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, 
State and local government agencies and authorities, the private 
sector, and other entities. 
 
• Ensure the timely and efficient access by the Department to all 
information necessary to discharge the responsibilities under 
Section 201 of the Act, including obtaining such information from 
other agencies of the Federal Government. 
 
• Review, analyze, and make recommendations for improvements 
in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law 
enforcement information, intelligence information, intelligence-
related information, and other information relating to homeland 
security within the Federal Government and between the Federal 
Government and State and local government agencies and 
authorities. 
 
• Disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the 
Department within the Department, to other agencies of the 
Federal Government with responsibilities relating to homeland 
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security, and to agencies of State and local governments and 
private sector entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in 
the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist 
attacks against the United States. 
 
• Consult with the Director of Central Intelligence and other 
appropriate intelligence, law enforcement, or other elements of the 
Federal Government to establish collection priorities and strategies 
for information, including law enforcement-related information, 
relating to threats of terrorism against the United States through 
such means as the representation of the Department in discussions 
regarding requirements and priorities in the collection of such 
information. 
 
• Consult with State and local governments and private sector 
entities to ensure appropriate exchanges of information, including 
law enforcement-related information, relating to threats of 
terrorism against the United States. 
 
• Ensure that— 
1. Any material received pursuant to the Act is protected 
from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only 
for the performance of official duties; and 
 
2. Any intelligence information under the Act is shared, 
retained, and disseminated consistent with the authority of 
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
sources and methods under the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. Section 401, et seq.) and related 
procedures and, as appropriate, similar authorities of the 
Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement 
information. 
 
• Request additional information from other agencies of the 
Federal Government, State and local government agencies, and the 
private sector relating to threats of terrorism in the United States, 
or relating to other areas of responsibility assigned by the 
Secretary, including the entry into cooperative agreements through 
the Secretary to obtain such information. 
 
• Establish and utilize, in conjunction with the Chief Information 
Officer of the Department, a secure communications and 
information technology infrastructure, including data-mining and 
other advanced analytical tools, in order to access, receive, and 
analyze data and information in furtherance of statutory 
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responsibilities, and to disseminate information acquired and 
analyzed by the Department, as appropriate. 
• Ensure, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the 
Department, that any information databases and analytical tools 
developed or utilized by the Department— 
1. Are compatible with one another and with relevant 
information databases of other agencies of the Federal 
Government; and 
 
2. Treat information in such databases in a manner that 
complies with applicable Federal law on privacy. 
 
• Coordinate training and other support to the elements and 
personnel of the Department, other agencies of the Federal 
Government, and State and local governments that provide 
information to the Department, or are consumers of information 
provided by the Department, in order to facilitate the identification 
and sharing of information revealed in their ordinary duties and the 
optimal utilization of information received from the Department. 
 
• Coordinate with elements of the intelligence community and with 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and the private 
sector, as appropriate. 
 
• Provide intelligence and information analysis and support to 
other elements of the Department. 
 
c. Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection: Will oversee the 
following Infrastructure Protection functions: 
 
• Carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the 
key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, 
including the performance of risk assessments to determine the 
risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United 
States (including an assessment of the probability of success of 
such attacks and the feasibility and potential efficacy of various 
countermeasures to such attacks). 
 
• In coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Information 
Analysis, integrate relevant information, analyses, and 
vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or 
assessments are provided or produced by the Department or others) 
in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures 
by the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, 
State and local government agencies and authorities, the private 
sector, and other entities. 
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• Develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key 
resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including 
power production, generation, and distribution systems, 
information technology and telecommunications systems 
(including satellites), electronic financial and property record 
storage and transmission systems, emergency preparedness 
communications systems, and the physical and technological assets 
that support such systems. 
 
• Recommend measures necessary to protect the key resources and 
critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with 
other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with 
State and local government agencies and authorities, the private 
sector, and other entities. 
 
• In coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, provide to State and local government 
entities, and upon request to private entities that own or operate 
critical information systems, crisis management support in 
response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems. 
 
• Provide technical assistance, upon request, to the private sector 
and other government entities, in coordination with the Under 
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, with respect 
to emergency recovery plans to respond to major failures of critical 
information systems. 
 
• Coordinate with other agencies of the Federal Government to 
provide specific warning information, and advice about appropriate 
protective measures and countermeasures, to State and local 
government agencies and authorities, the private sector, other 
entities, and the public. 
 
2. Science and Technology 
 
Under Secretary for Science and Technology: Will be responsible for performing 
the functions set forth in Section 302 of the Act, including the following: 
 
• Advise the Secretary regarding research and development efforts 
and priorities in support of the Department’s missions. 
 
• Develop, in consultation with other appropriate executive 
agencies, a national policy and strategic plan for identifying 
priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for, and coordinating the 
Federal Government’s civilian efforts with respect to, identifying 
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and developing countermeasures to chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats, 
including the development of comprehensive, research based 
definable goals for such efforts and of annual measurable 
objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals 
for such efforts. 
 
• Support the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection by assessing and testing homeland 
security vulnerabilities and possible threats. 
 
• Conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, 
testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all 
elements of the Department, through both intramural and 
extramural programs, except that such responsibility does not 
extend to human health-related research and development 
activities. 
 
• Establish priorities for directing, funding, and conducting 
national research, development, test and evaluation, and 
procurement of technology and systems for— 
 
1. Preventing the importation of chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and related weapons and material; and 
 
2. Detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding 
to terrorist attacks. 
 
• Establish a system for transferring homeland security 
developments or technologies to Federal, State, and local 
governments, and to private sector entities. 
 
• Enter into work agreements, joint sponsorships, contracts, or any 
other agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use 
of the national laboratories or sites and support of the science and 
technology base at those facilities. 
 
• Collaborate with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney 
General as provided in Section 212 of the Agricultural 
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. § 8401), as 
amended by Section 1709(b) of the Act. 
 
• Collaborate with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
and the Attorney General in determining any new biological agents 
and toxins that shall be listed as ‘select agents’ in Appendix A of 
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part 72 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to 
Section 351A of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 262a). 
 
• Support United States leadership in science and technology. 
 
• Establish and administer the primary research and development 
activities of the Department, including the long-term research and 
development needs and capabilities for all elements of the 
Department. 
 
• Coordinate and integrate all research, development, 
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities of the Department. 
 
• Coordinate with other appropriate executive agencies in 
developing and carrying out the science and technology agenda of 
the Department to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs. 
 
• Develop and oversee the administration of guidelines for merit 
review of research and development projects throughout the 
Department, and for the dissemination of research conducted or 
sponsored by the Department. 
 
3. Border and Transportation Security 
The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (“BTS”) will include the 
following: the Bureau of Border Security; the Office for Domestic Preparedness; 
the Customs Service; the Transportation Security Administration; FLETC; and 
FPS. 
 
The BTS Directorate will also have in place the key leaders of the new 
Directorate to include: 
 
a. Under Secretary for BTS: Will be responsible for oversight of all 
responsibilities set forth in Section 402 of the Act, including the 
following: 
 
• Prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism 
into the United States. 
 
• Secure the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, 
and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States, 
including managing and coordinating those functions transferred to 
the Department at ports of entry. 
 
• Establish and administer rules, in accordance with Section 428 of 
the Act, governing the granting of visas or other forms of 
permission, including parole, to enter the United States to 
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individuals who are not a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States. 
 
• Establish national immigration enforcement policies and 
priorities. 
 
• Administer the customs laws of the United States, except as 
otherwise provided in the Act. 
 
• Conduct the inspection and related administrative functions of 
the USDA transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security under 
Section 421 of the Act. 
 
• In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities, ensure the speedy, 
orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce. 
 
• Carry out the immigration enforcement functions specified under 
Section 441 of the Act that were vested by statute in, or performed 
by, the Commissioner of the INS (or any officer, employee, or 
component of the INS) immediately before the date on which the 
transfer of functions takes place. 
 
b. Assistant Secretary for Border Security: Will report directly to the 
Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, and whose 
responsibilities will include the following: 
 
• Establish and oversee the administration of the policies for 
performing such functions as are-- 
 
1. Transferred to the Under Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security by Section 441 of the Act and 
delegated to the Assistant Secretary by the Under 
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security; or 
 
2. Otherwise vested in the Assistant Secretary by law. 
 
• Advise the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation 
Security with respect to any policy or operation of the Bureau of 
Border Security that may affect the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration. 
 
c. Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness - Will report directly 
to the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security and will 
have the primary responsibility within the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government for the preparedness of the United States for acts of terrorism, 
including the following responsibilities: 
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• Coordinate preparedness efforts at the Federal level, and work 
with all State, local, tribal, parish, and private sector emergency 
response providers on all matters pertaining to combating 
terrorism, including training, exercises, and equipment support. 
 
• Coordinate or, as appropriate, consolidate communications and 
systems of communications relating to homeland security at all 
levels of government. 
 
• Direct and supervise terrorism preparedness grant programs of 
the Federal Government (other than those programs administered 
by the Department of Health and Human Services) for all 
emergency response providers. 
 
• Incorporate homeland security priorities into planning guidance 
on an agency level for the preparedness efforts of the Office for 
Domestic Preparedness. 
 
• Provide agency-specific training for agents and analysts within 
the Department, other agencies, and State and local agencies, and 
international entities. 
 
• As the lead executive branch agency for preparedness of the 
United States for acts of terrorism, cooperate closely with the 
FEMA, which shall have the primary responsibility within the 
executive branch to prepare for and mitigate the effects of 
nonterrorist-related disasters in the United States. 
 
• Assist and support the Secretary, in coordination with other 
Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting 
appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities of State, 
local, and tribal governments consistent with the mission and 
functions of the Directorate. 
 
• Supervise those elements of the Office of National Preparedness 
of FEMA that relate to terrorism, which shall be consolidated 
within the Department in the ODP established pursuant to Section 
430 of the Act. 
 
4. Emergency Preparedness and Response 
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate will be headed by the 
Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. 
 
Under Secretary for EP&R: Will be responsible for all of those functions included 
within Section 502 of the Act, including: 
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• Helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response 
providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies. 
 
• With respect to the Nuclear Incident Response Team (regardless 
of whether it is operating as an organizational unit of the 
Department pursuant to the Act): 
 
1. Establishing standards and certifying when those 
standards have been met; 
 
2. Conducting joint and other exercises and training and 
evaluating performance; and, 
 
3. Providing funds to the Department of Energy and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, as appropriate, for 
homeland security planning, exercises and training, and 
equipment. 
 
• Providing the Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks 
and major disasters, including: 
 
1. Managing such response; 
 
2. Directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the 
Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical 
System, and (when operating as an organizational unit of 
the Department pursuant to the Act) the Nuclear Incident 
Response Team; 
 
3. Overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System; 
and 
 
4. Coordinating other Federal response resources in the 
event of a terrorist attack or major disaster. 
 
• Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters; 
 
• Building a comprehensive national incident management system 
with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and 
authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters. 
 
• Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response 
plans into a single, coordinated national response plan; and 
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• Developing comprehensive programs for developing 
interoperative communications technology, and helping to ensure 
that emergency response providers acquire such technology. 
 
5. Other Officers and Functions 
a. Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: Will report 
directly to the Deputy Secretary; and will be responsible for the following: 
 
• Establishing the policies for performing such functions as are 
transferred to the Director by Section 451 of the Act or otherwise 
vested in the Director by law. 
 
• Oversight of the administration of such policies. 
 
• Advising the Deputy Secretary with respect to any policy or 
operation of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 
that may affect the Bureau of Border Security of the Department, 
including potentially conflicting policies or operations. 
 
• Establishing national immigration services policies and priorities. 
 
• Meeting regularly with the Ombudsman described in Section 452 
of the Act to correct serious service problems identified by the 
Ombudsman. 
 
• Establishing procedures requiring a formal response to any 
recommendations submitted in the Ombudsman’s annual report to 
Congress within three months after its submission to Congress. 
 
b. Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman: Will report directly to the 
Deputy Secretary; and will be responsible for the following: 
 
• Assisting individuals and employers in resolving problems with 
the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
 
• Identifying areas in which individuals and employers have 
problems in dealing with the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services; and 
 
• Proposing changes in the administrative practices of the Bureau 
of Citizenship and Immigration Services to mitigate identified 
problems. 
 
(3) Specification of the funds available to each agency that will be transferred to the 
Department as a result of transfers under the plan. 
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• The attached tables provide estimates of the funds available to the 
agencies and entities that will be transferred to the Department by 
operation of the Act. The two tables include total funding (mandatory and 
discretionary including fees) and discretionary funding net of fees. The 
tables provide the enacted levels for 2002 and 2002 supplementals, and the 
President’s requested levels for 
2003. 
 
Because of the current state of the 2003 budget process, information 
concerning the funds that will be available to each transferring agency on 
the date of the proposed transfers is not currently available and will not 
likely be available during the time period in which the President is to 
submit this Reorganization Plan.  As additional information becomes 
available, it will be provided as may be required in accordance with the 
procedures under the Act for modification of this Plan or other applicable 
law. 
 
(4) Specification of the proposed allocations within the Department of unexpended 
funds transferred in connection with transfers under the plan. 
 
• The attached tables provide estimates of the unobligated balances as of 
September 30, 2002, for the agencies and programs that will be transferred 
to the Department.  The first table provides estimates of unobligated 
balances for the accounts that are moving to the Department in whole.  
The second table provides estimates of the unobligated balances in the 
accounts of which only a portion will be transferring to the new 
Department.  These latter estimates, however, are of the unobligated 
balances for the full account, only a portion of which are associated with 
the activities that will be transferred to the Department.  In addition, these 
unobligated balances are based on the Department of Treasury’s estimates 
as of September 30, 2002, which are the latest available figures.  Since 
October 1, 2002, Departments and agencies (except the Department of 
Defense) have been operating under continuing resolutions, and, as such, 
have been spending these balances to maintain current operations. 
 
Authority to reallocate unexpended funds of agencies transferred under 
this Plan is found in H.J. Res. 124, the continuing resolution in effect 
currently and until January 11, 2003.  The resolution provides authority 
for the Office of Management and Budget to transfer an amount not to 
exceed $140,000,000 from unobligated balances of appropriations enacted 
before October 1, 2002 “for organizations and entities that will be 
transferred to the new Department and for salaries and expenses associated 
with the initiation of the Department.”  Such authority may be exercised 
upon providing 15 days’ notice to the Appropriations Committees.  We 
anticipate that it may be necessary to provide funding through such 
transfers both for transferring entities and for salaries and expenses 
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associated with the initiation of the Department, including, for example, 
those associated with establishing the Office of the Secretary and other 
new offices provided for in the Act. Any plan to use such funding will 
follow the procedures required under the continuing resolution, including 
the provision of at least 15 days’ notice to the Appropriations Committees. 
 
(5) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, facilities, contracts, 
records, and other assets and obligations of agencies transferred under the plan. 
 
• There is no intention to dispose of property, facility, contracts, records, 
and other assets and obligations of agencies transferred under the plan. All 
of such assets and obligations will transfer with each agency pursuant to 
Section 1511(d)(1) of the Act. 
 
• Prior to and during the transition period (as defined by Section 
1501(a)(2) of the Act), the Department may identify property, facilities, 
contracts, records, and other assets and obligations of agencies transferred 
that would be candidates for disposition due to duplication, non-use, 
obsolescence, and the like.  If and when any such proposed dispositions 
are identified, we will follow provisions of the Act relating to modification 
of this plan or further notification of Congress. 
 
(6) Specification of the proposed allocations within the Department of the functions 
of the agencies and subdivisions that are not related directly to securing the 
homeland. 
• As agencies and subdivisions are transferred into the Department, any 
functions of those entities that are not directly related to securing the 
homeland will continue to be allocated to the agencies and subdivisions in 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF CURRENT DHS SENIOR LEADERSHIP 
AND THEIR NOMINATION STATUS 
Secretary: Governor Tom Ridge 
On October 8, 2001, Tom Ridge was sworn in as the first Office of Homeland 
Security Advisor in the history of the United States of America. 
 
Deputy Secretary: Gordon England 
On January 30, Gordon England was confirmed as Deputy Secretary, Department 
of Homeland Security. 
 
Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security: Asa Hutchinson 
On January 23, Asa Hutchinson was confirmed as Under Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security. 
 
Under Secretary for Science and Technology: Dr. Charles E. McQueary 
On January 10, President Bush announced his intention to nominate Dr. Charles 
E. McQueary to be Under Secretary for Science and Technology. 
 
Under Secretary for Management: Janet Hale 
President Bush intends to nominate Janet Hale as Under Secretary for 
Management. Ms. Hale is currently the Assistant Secretary for Budget, Technology and 
Finance for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness & Response: Michael Brown 
President Bush announced on January 10 his intention to nominate Michael 
Brown as the first Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) in 
the newly created Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Inspector General: Clark Kent Ervin 
President Bush has announced his intention to nominate Clark Kent Ervin as 
Inspector General. Mr. Ervin currently serves as Inspector General of the Department of 
State. 
 
Director, United States Secret Service: W. Ralph Basham 
Since January 2002, Mr. Basham has served as Chief of Staff for the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Among his responsibilities at TSA, Mr. 
Basham oversaw the hiring of federal security directors for the nation's 429 airports. 
 
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard: Admiral Thomas H. Collins 
Admiral Thomas H. Collins assumed the duties of Commandant of the U.S. Coast 
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APPENDIX C.  INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (IAIP) DIVISION GUIDANCE 
(Source: US Department of Homeland Security website, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=52.) 
 
Synthesizing and Disseminating Information. 
The Department of Homeland Security, through the Directorate of Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) will merge under one roof the capability to identify 
and assess current and future threats to the homeland, map those threats against our 
vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings and take preventive and protective action. 
Intelligence Analysis and Alerts. 
Actionable intelligence - that is, information which can lead to stopping or apprehending 
terrorists--is essential to the primary mission of DHS.  The timely and thorough analysis 
and dissemination of information about terrorists and their activities will improve the 
government's ability to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts and to provide useful warning to 
the private sector and our population. The Directorate will fuse and analyze information 
from multiple sources pertaining to terrorist threats. The Department will be a full partner 
and consumer of all intelligence-generating agencies, such as the National Security 
Agency, the CIA, and the FBI.  
The Department's threat analysis and warning functions will support the President and, as 
he directs, other national decision-makers responsible for securing the homeland from 
terrorism.  It will coordinate and, as appropriate, consolidate the federal government's 
lines of communication with state and local public safety agencies and with the private 
sector, creating a coherent and efficient system for conveying actionable intelligence and 
other threat information. The IAIP Directorate will also administer the Homeland 
Security Advisory System.  
As designed, IAIP fully reflects the President's commitment to safeguard our way of life, 
including the integrity of our democratic political system and the essential elements of 
our individual liberty.  To further ensure such protections, DHS will establish an office 
for a chief Privacy Officer. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
The attacks of September 11 highlighted the fact that terrorists are capable of causing 
enormous damage to our country by attacking our critical infrastructure -food, water, 
agriculture, and health and emergency services; energy sources (electrical, nuclear, gas 
and oil, dams); transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways); information and 
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telecommunications networks; banking and finance systems; postal and other assets and 
systems vital to our national security, public health and safety, economy and way of life.  
Protecting America's critical infrastructure is the shared responsibility of federal, state, 
and local government, in active partnership with the private sector, which owns 
approximately 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure.  IAIP will take the lead in 
coordinating the national effort to secure the nation's infrastructure.  This will give state, 
local, and private entities one primary contact instead of many for coordinating protection 
activities within the federal government, including vulnerability assessments, strategic 
planning efforts, and exercises.  
Cyber Security. 
Our nation's information and telecommunications systems are directly connected to many 
other critical infrastructure sectors, including banking and finance, energy, and 
transportation. The consequences of an attack on our cyber infrastructure can cascade 
across many sectors, causing widespread disruption of essential services, damaging our 
economy, and imperiling public safety.  The speed, virulence, and maliciousness of cyber 
attacks have increased dramatically in recent years.  Accordingly, the Directorate places 
an especially high priority on protecting our cyber infrastructure from terrorist attack by 
unifying and focusing the key cyber security activities performed by the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office (currently part of the Department of Commerce) and the 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI).  The Directorate will augment those 
capabilities with the response functions of the Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center (General Services Administration).  Because our information and 
telecommunications sectors are increasingly interconnected, DHS will also assume the 
functions and assets of the National Communications System (Department of Defense), 
which coordinates emergency preparedness for the telecommunications sector. 
Indications and Warning Advisories.  In advance of real-time crisis or attack, IAIP will 
provide:  
• Threat warnings and advisories against the homeland including physical and 
cyber events.  
• Processes to develop and issue national and sector-specific threat advisories 
through the Homeland Security Advisory System.    
• Terrorist threat information for release to the public, private industry, or state and 
local government. 
Partnerships. The IAIP team will establish:  
• Partnerships with key government, public, private, and international stakeholders 
to create an environment that enables them to better protect their infrastructures.    
• Awareness programs, development of information sharing mechanisms, and 
sector focused best practices and guidelines.  
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National Communications System.  The IAIP team will provide:  
• Coordination of planning and provision of National Security and Emergency 
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APPENDIX D.  LIST OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
CONFERENCES ON HOMELAND SECURITY ATTENDED TO 
COLLECT RESEARCH 
Note: The following is a list of national and regional conferences on homeland security 
and intelligence support attended, or obtained conferences summaries from, in collecting 
research for this thesis.  In addition, the list includes presentations from officials currently 
tasked with homeland security responsibilities.  These conferences and presentations 
provided a forum to discuss thesis research with intelligence and law enforcement experts 
at the federal, state, and local levels and uncover the ‘ground truth’ about the role of 
intelligence in the new Department of Homeland Security. 
• AFCEA Fall Intelligence Symposium, DIAC, Bowling Air Force Base, 
23-24 October 2002 
• AFCEA and the Naval Institute West 2003, “The Next Step: From Change 
to Transformation,” San Diego Convention Center, 14-16 January 2003 
• AFCEA Intelligence Committee February meeting, “Army Intelligence’s 
Information Dominance Center,” Army Intelligence and Security 
Command Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 13 February 2003 
• Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) Annual Symposium, 
“Terrorism, Technology, and Strategy,” Northern Virginia, 01-02 
November 2002 
• El Paso Intelligence Center conference, “Intelligence, Security, and 
Terrorism: Our Role in Homeland Defense,” El Paso, Texas, 17-18 
September 2002 
• Government Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security, 
Philadelphia, PA, 19-21 August 2002 
• Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) 40th Anniversary Conference, 
“Preparing America’s Leaders,” Defense Intelligence Agency’s Tighe 
Auditorium, Bolling Air Force Base, 19 June 2002 
• Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning (TEW) group monthly meeting, Los 
Angeles, California, 26 September 2002 
• McGraw Hill/Aviation Week & Space Technology Homeland Security 
Summit, Ronald Reagan International Trade Center in Washington, D.C., 
06-07 May 2002. 
• MGEN Bruce Lawlor, Senior Director for Protection and Prevention, 
Office of Homeland Security, presentation entitled “The Future of 
Homeland Security” 
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• National Defense University and University of Maryland conference, 
“Homeland Security: The Civil-Military Dimensions,” Fort McNair, 
Washington, D.C., 19-20 September 2002. 
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APPENDIX E.  2002 GOVERNMENT SYMPOSIUM FOR 
INFORMATION SHARING AND HOMELAND SECURITY AFTER 
ACTION REPORT 
Note: The following is a copy of the After Action Report written on the 2002 
Government Symposium for Information Sharing and Homeland Security, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, 19-21 August 2002. 
 
To:   Distribution 
From:  LT Shawn Moyer 
 
Subject:  GOVERNMENT SYMPOSIUM FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
AND HOMELAND SECURITY, PHILADELPHIA, PA  19-21 AUG 02 
 
1.   Conference Summary: 
From 19-21 August 2002, I attended the Government Symposium for Information 
Sharing and Homeland Security in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to obtain research to 
support my thesis development at NPS.  The conference, sponsored by The Government 
Emerging Technology Alliance (GETA), brought together members of various federal, 
state, and local communities to address Homeland Security-related information.  Co-
sponsored by the US Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement Community, DoD, 
Federal, Local and State Agencies, the convention focuses on gathering, sharing and 
interpreting information across the wide spectrum of agencies tasked with contributing to 
Homeland Security.  Government experts from the CIA, NSA, DIA, NRO, ATF, DISA, 
US Navy, Office of Homeland Security, IMO, IC CIO, Law Enforcement Working 
Group, the Departments of Justice, Interior and Energy and various other organizations 
planned the content and co-hosted the convention.  The conference provided an initial 
and unprecedented attempt for experts to share insights and expertise.  Most importantly, 
the conference highlighted the unique challenges surrounding Homeland Security. 
My purpose for attending the conference was to obtain inputs from experts within 
the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies regarding what should go into 
developing NS3156 Intelligence Support to Homeland Security at NPS.  The conference 
agenda included numerous plenary sessions with a wide range of keynote speakers such 
as Congressman Curt Weldin (7th District Pennsylvania), Steven Cooper (Special 
Assistant to the President, Senior Director for Information Integration and Chief 
Information Officer, Office of Homeland Security CIO), and Mr. Shabtai Shavit (former 
Head of Israeli Intelligence Agency-Mossad).  The conference also broke down into four 
distinctive tracks: 1) Intelligence for Homeland Security: Integrating Policy, Law, and 
Culture, 2) Information Technology: Applicability to Information Sharing, 3) Critical 
Information Needs of the First Responder, and 4) Training and Education for Homeland 
Security.  I attended the track 4 panel discussions looking to obtain inputs, resources, and 
insights for my thesis research.   
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2. Plenary Session Highlights: 
The plenary sessions featured presentations from the President’s Office of 
Homeland Security, a Media Panel, and Congressional Panel.  The Media panel consisted 
of Broadcast, News, and Print media highlighting the critical role the Media plays in 
Information Sharing for Homeland Security.  Discussions included the media’s role to 
help prevent crisis, dissemination of critical information during local and national 
emergencies, and the responsibility of the media to cooperate with government in the 
dissemination of sensitive information.  The Congressional panel featured representatives 
and senators on the various intelligence and related committees to discuss issues pertinent 
to information sharing and actions of Congress to fight the war against terrorism.  The 
congressional panel highlighted a discussion on the progress on the President’s proposed 
new Department of Homeland Security and included audience interaction. 
Congressman Curt Weldin provided a motivational presentation during the first 
plenary session.  He highlighted some of the frustrations and chaos that existed around 
the events of 9/11 stating, “The American government failed the American people on 
September 11th.”  The overriding theme in his speech called for the need to develop an 
integrated domestic communications capability because of the frustrations experienced in 
information sharing between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies.  
Two outstanding issues for HLS experts to address are 1) Information sharing with the 
technology currently existing and 2) Taking a political stance on Homeland Defense. 
Steven Cooper spoke during the second plenary session.  Mr. Cooper provided a 
unique perspective of the challenges the Office of Homeland Security faces.  He 
demanded the audience become thoroughly familiar with the Administration’s HLS 
Strategy released in July.  In addition, he outlined the “CONOPS for HLS” as a trinity 
composed of 1) National Strategy, 2) Functional Capabilities, and 3) Information.  From 
this trinity individual agencies can see how they fit into the national enterprise 
architecture (not federal).  Mr. Cooper added that pockets of experts exist in the United 
States; the question is how does the Office of HLS get to them?  For, example the Office 
HLS CIO has established three working groups: 1) Border Security (farthest along), 2) 
First Responder Community, 3) CBRN (least amount done).  Mr. Cooper emphasized the 
need to gather a knowledge base among various agencies within the US in order to secure 
the Homeland.  He called upon the audience to bring forth the best practices, centers of 
excellence, and initiatives underway that are relevant and should be incorporated by the 
Office HLS.  The Office of HLS is in the process of establishing an unclassified website 
for coordinating HLS initiatives and resources.  The goal is to build upon what already 
exists and not to start from scratch.  Lastly, he highlighted the inherent risks/challenges 
associated with HLS: balancing privacy and civil liberties with security, aligning policy 
and laws with desired outcomes, leveraging cultural beliefs and diversity to achieve 
collaborative change, consolidating/replicating good efforts, working together to 
overcome political and cultural barriers, introducing new technologies, money, and 
communicating expectation management.  I personally enjoyed Mr. Cooper’s speech 
because instead of making a public relations pitch he chose to highlight some of the 
unique challenges and tasks the Office of HLS is taking on and more importantly the 
need for every individual agency to become involved. 
Mr. Shabtai Shavit, former director Israeli Intelligence Agency, provided one of 
the conference’s most intriguing presentations during the third plenary session.  He 
87 
provided initial background data on the workings of the Israeli Intelligence Agency 
(Mossad).  Mossad provides Israel with a service for intelligence collection and special 
functions, operating outside Israeli borders.  Mr. Shavit noted the Mossad does not work 
directly with Israeli law enforcement and security forces.  He also noted “the United 
States needs to refine its definition of terrorism.”  The West has a difficulty dealing with 
terrorism because it mixes terrorists with guerillas, vigilantes, etc. making it difficult to 
identify not only the threat but also how to counter the threat.  He suggested defining 
terrorism as the use of violence against civilians to enhance political gains.  The three 
required components being the nature to act, the aim, and the target (civilians).  
Terrorism needs to be differentiated from guerilla warfare.  This critical step will help the 
US Intelligence Community pull other resources into place.  His presentation also 
provided a few assumptions/guidelines for intelligence: 1) protecting the secrecy of 
sources must be HOLY, 2) intelligence needs to get to the people who need it, 3) 
intelligence requires a balance of judgment and regulation, and 4) command challenges 
must be as concise and short as possible.  The later part of his presentation focused on the 
similarities and differences between the Mossad and the US Intelligence Community and 
the implications for conducting homeland defense.  In 1991, Israel established the 
Homefront Command to protect people.  The Homefront Command was an intelligence 
consumer not a producer.  The Homefront Command is integrated with the Israeli 
national intelligence system unlike the Department of Homeland Security.  The 
Department of Homeland Security will have both regulatory and operational power 
requiring the US to work through establishing a system of reciprocity between consumers 
and producers of intelligence.  On a side note, Mr. Shabit concluded you know you are 
winning the War on Terrorism when the enemy raises white flags from the rooftop of its 
houses. 
Dr. Stephen Gale, Director of the Center for Organizational Dynamics, chaired a 
provocative fourth plenary session.  Adding an academic perspective to the conference, 
Dr. Gale focused on the issue of information sharing.  He posed three questions for HLS 
agencies: 1) what is it we want to sharing information for, 2) how do we organize the 
information under one department to make decisions, and 3) how do we develop an 
integrated information sharing system?  He provided numerous examples of the detailed 
level of information sharing required in protecting the United States.  Answering the first 
question requires coming to grips with what Al Qaeda is and what its intentions are.  
From his 25 years of experience in studying terrorism, he stated Al Qaeda is detailed 
highly integrated organization focused on conducting small-scale attacks that disrupt the 
United States way of life.  He emphatically emphasized the threat of terrorism is serious 
beyond our wildest dreams.  He also noted information sharing has to be driven by 
objectives and existing capabilities, if not “we are merely swapping stories.”  Information 
sharing must be directed to what the threat is.  In an analogy he stated, “When it comes to 
information sharing on homeland security the intelligence analyst must be connected to 
the railroad car conductor to the chemical producers and to the first responders.”  
Establishing an integrated information sharing system to conduct such efforts proves to 
be the most difficult obstacle for Homeland Security. 
 I also attended a panel discussion of senior representatives from several national 
intelligence agencies that discussed the agencies’ role in HLS.  Mr. Philip Lago, 
Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency, noted the HLS is a new role for the 
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CIA.  The CIA has little expertise on what’s inside the borders of the US.  The agency is 
working enhancing relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by 
exchanging analysts and liaisons.  However, he noted the CIA is not a domestic law 
agency and a number of laws and regulations prohibit the CIA from becoming fully 
immersed in HLS.  Russ Travers, Deputy Director for Policy Support, Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), discussed DIA’s role in HLS.  HLS is not primarily a military 
task but there are some things the agency can contribute to Homeland Defense.  Several 
examples given he highlighted were the Joint Intel Task Force-CT, the DHS 
counterintelligence terrorist group, ONI’s partnership with the Coast Guard, the Armed 
Forces Medical Center involvement in CBN education and prevention, Central MASINT, 
and the inter-department liaisons existing at the Unified Commands.  He noted DIA has a 
long way to go with numerous legal questions to work through.  For the time being the 
best work will continue to be done at the grassroots level.  Lastly, he highlighted several 
outstanding issues for information sharing: technical issues, cultural issues, what 
information should be shared, legal limits, and policy-making issues; the most difficult 
being cultural and policy-making issues.  He envisioned a move towards a global 
intelligence world where all-source analytical fusion will take place in a central location. 
The final day of the conference had two plenary sessions.  The first consisted of a 
panel discussion among members of the law enforcement community.  Jeffrey Baxter, 
Consultant of the Law Enforcement Working Group, moderated the session.  Panelists 
included Karen Rowan, General Counsel to the Superintendent, Chicago Police 
Department, Chief Jose Cordero, Newton, MA Police Department, Deputy Chief William 
Casey, Boston Police Department, and Kathleen Kiernan, Assistant Director, ATF, 
member of Law Enforcement Working Group.  Ms. Rowan talked about the Chicago 
Police Departments’ CLEAR (Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting) 
Program.  She demonstrated how CLEAR helps solve the unsolvable crimes, emphasizes 
linking information, and guides police where to focus, and shares data from 132 suburban 
areas.   
The second panel discussion brought together various representatives from 
different sources of the media.  Led by moderator Les Schwartz, CIA, the panel 
addressed the media’s role in HLS.  Tom Tetter, Government Computer News journalist, 
discussed the importance of data sharing between all the various agencies involved in 
HLS.  One of the major challenges continues to be developing a technological means for 
transmitting data to the people who need it.  Dana Priest, Washington Post reporter, 
addressed the difficult relationship existing between the government and the media.  She 
made several comments regarding the recent leaks of classified information from the 
media.  In her view the media tries to balance what information should be shared with the 
public through personal discernment policies that sometimes become controversial.  The 
controversy exists because the media stands by protecting its sources.  Dan Burton, 
Computer World reporter, provided some controversial insights regarding the media’s 
role in reporting.  He stated the lack of professionalism exhibited by a lot of current 
reporting on the events of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism.  He stated the media has an 
obligation to not only report the news but also ensure they take into consideration their 
role as citizens in the War on Terrorism.  His analogy of the “Mike Wallace story” 
exemplified the types of inappropriate principles some media members are following.  
The most important point Mr. Burton made was, “The leaks must stop.”  This panel 
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discussion marked some of the controversial views existing in the relationship between 
the Intelligence Community and the media. 
  
3. Track 4 Panel Discussion Highlights: 
“An organization's ability to learn and translate that learning into action is the 
ultimate competitive advantage.”  Jack Welch, CEO GE  
Training and education for Homeland Security is the absolute critical 
underpinning of an overall long-range success strategy.  This track developed synergy 
within the education and training organizations of the Intelligence and (recently 
expanding) national security Communities (Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Federal, 
State, and Local Governments).  Featured presentations included professional intelligence 
education and training, analytical training, and Operational Security (OPSEC) training 
with representatives of major institutions and programs.  The track highlighted best 
practices and shared equities to assist in the development of an effective, inclusive, and 
comprehensive education and training program--essential for Homeland Security.  “The 
advancement of learning depends on community leadership...and the products of that 
learning, in turn, are essential to the leadership's hopes for continued progress and 
prosperity...”  (To have been delivered at Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963)  John F. 
Kennedy  
Track 4 was chaired Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, Joint Military Intelligence 
College and coordinated by Mr. Radar O'Reilly, Intelligence Community CIO. 
 
Session #1: The Joint Military Intelligence College and The Joint Intelligence 
Virtual University (JIVU) Online Distributive Training  
Chairmen: Mr. Denis Clift and H. David Banks Jr., Chief, Training Technology & 
Operations Division Joint Military Intelligence Training Center  
Mr. Denis Clift discussed the role of the Joint Military Intelligence College 
(JMIC).  JMIC is the only accredited school offering graduate and undergraduate degrees 
in intelligence.  JMIC provides a vanguard of research on classified and unclassified 
material on intelligence issues.  Charted by the DoD in 1962, the mission of JMIC 
focuses on the education of civilian and military intelligence professionals.  Mr. Clift 
highlighted some of the issues students are tackling at JMIC: the establishment of 
NORTHCOM, intelligence and law enforcement, the intelligence cycle, intelligence and 
policy-making, information superiority, all-source analysis, information sharing, and 
predictive intelligence (ex.  Terrorism).  He emphasized the need to incorporate 
intelligence resources such as INTELINK, JWICS, JDISS, and NIST Teams.  One 
valuable aspect HLS training and education can incorporate to enhance learning is the 
Case Study method. 
The presentation also provided an overview of the capabilities of the Intelligence 
Community's online distributive training capability - the Joint Intelligence Virtual 
University (JIVU), an interactive, web-centric learning environment.  It connects students 
and instructors to expand learning access, reduce costs, and increase collaborative 
information flow.  It is “anytime, anywhere” training, providing the full spectrum of 
support materials for community training.  Starting out as a DIA initiative to support the 
DoD intelligence training community, JIVU has evolved into the sole online distributive 
training capability for the entire U.S. Intelligence Community.  In just over 18 months, 
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JIVU has over 4000 registered users, and offers over 200 intelligence courses with 
several courses being developed.  The presentation concluded with a screen-capture 
demonstration of the various JIVU capabilities.  One shortfall to JIVU is the fact access is 
restricted to those with DoD security clearances.  The JIVU has not developed a strategy 
to connect, coordinate, and tap into law enforcement agency resources.  One 
recommendation would be for JIVU to develop ways to get around classification 
requirements to expand its reach to all agencies contributing to intelligence support to 
HLS. 
 
Session #2: Training & Information Considerations for Homeland Security  
Chairman: Ed Jopeck, Director of Security Analysis & Risk Management, 
Veridian  
The increased focus on homeland security has rapidly brought into focus two 
major shortcomings . First, the shortage of skilled antiterrorism analysts to assess security 
needs of critical infrastructures and potential terrorist targets in the U.S. Second, the 
difficulty that most agencies are having in obtaining and assessing threat information for 
their areas of responsibility.  A successful response to terrorism in the U.S. will require 
significant improvements in both areas.  This presentation provided a corporate civilian’s 
observations and experiences based on nearly a decade of performing antiterrorism and 
risk assessments, both in the classified and unclassified environment.  Mr. Jopeck 
explored the challenge law enforcement agencies and non-national security related 
agencies face in trying to perform their new homeland security roles. His presentation 
provided actions training professionals can implement to better prepare their students to 
assume the responsibilities of providing the type of intelligence and security analysis 
absolutely required to truly effect homeland security in the future.  Mr. Jopeck’s Risk 
Management model provided one way for the Department of HLS (DHS) to standardize 
risk assessment of US critical infrastructure.  The presentation failed to address how the 
DHS can go about conducting an initial assessment of the vast amount of work involved 
in mapping out all of the United States’ infrastructure (transportation, 
telecommunications, electric, government operations, finance, water, oil and gas, and 
emergency services).  How can the DHS coordinate infrastructure mapping of the United 
States similar to the way the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) maps foreign 
infrastructure?  
 
Session #3: Operational Security (OPSEC): An Out of Body Experience  
Thomas P. Mauriello, Director of Interagency OPSEC Support Staff  
Mr. Mauriello presented a dynamic and informative briefing on the principles of 
Operational Security (commonly referred to as OPSEC).  His briefing included an 
overview of the five-step analytical OPSEC process. He explained how OPSEC can and 
should be integrated into all operations to provide effective protection of critical and 
proprietary information.  OPSEC is being implemented throughout the national and 
homeland security communities as a planning methodology vital to the success of 
securing homeland assets.  He also discussed the mission of the Interagency OPSEC 
Support Staff (IOSS) that acts as a consultant to all U.S. government departments and 
agencies, and contractors sponsored by the U.S. government that have a national security 
mission.  OPSEC is more than a program--it is a state of mind.  It focuses on the 
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protection of critical, but unclassified information that becomes advantageous in the 
hands of the adversary.  
 
Session #4: Lessons in Homeland Security: Learning by the Case Method  
Chairman: Thomas Shreeve, Thomas W. Shreeve & Associates  
Mr. Shreeve described how a powerful and effective learning methodology 
known as the “case method”“ can be applied to homeland security.  The case method is 
the predominant form of teaching at leading U.S. graduate schools of business and public 
administration.  The speaker, Thomas W. Shreeve, is the director of the US Intelligence 
Community Case Method Program and is widely regarded as the nation's leading 
practitioner of case-based teaching in intelligence, national security, and federal law 
enforcement.  Mr. Shreeve retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1998 
following a career that included service in the Marine Corps, the New York City Police 
Department, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
Mr. Shreeve’s brief outlined the methodology required for implementing this 
valuable educational tool.  He defined the case-based discipline; goals associated with the 
method, and provided examples to use.  Most importantly, he addressed the dos and 
don’ts for instructors and the lessons learned he is experienced using this method. 
 
Session #5A: Role of the Central Intelligence Mission Academy and the CIA 
University 
Chairman: Dr. Elaine Riddle, Director CIA Mission Academy (CIA University) 
Dr. Riddle discussed the mission and organizational structure of the CIA 
University.  She noted the CIA is making an effort to contribute to the new and 
increasing demands of Homeland Security.  I obtained copies of her presentation if 
anyone is interested.   
 
Session #5B: National Geospatial Intelligence School: HS Initiatives  
Chairman: MAJ Wesley Baker, Chief Homeland Security Training, USAF  
Major Baker presented NIMA's reorganization initiative of its training and 
doctrine arm to better support national priorities (including) homeland security; a brief 
overview of the NIMA’s new Homeland Security Training program with course 
offerings; a report on a recent series of Geographic Information System conferences that 
have direct implication for Homeland Security information needs; and a proposal for a 
new geospatial training consortium partnering his organization with other DoD, 
government, and civilian agencies.  His brief highlighted some of the grassroots effort 
being done by NIMA to share information between national intelligence agencies and 
state, local, and tribal sector agencies and overcome cultural barriers currently existing 
amongst the various agencies. 
 
Session #6: Training, Services, and Operational Support Provided by the ATF  
Chairman: Mark Logan, Assistant Director Training & Professional Development, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms  
Participants in this session received information about training, services, and 
operational support available from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, a 
Bureau of the U.S. Department of Treasury that enforces the Federal laws and regulations 
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involving alcohol, tobacco, firearms, arson, and explosives.  Federal, state, and local 
agencies can tap these ATF resources to develop effective and comprehensive homeland 
security and critical incident training and response programs.  Training programs 
discussed included domestic and international firearms trafficking programs (including 
President Bush's Project Safe Neighborhoods); explosives post-blast investigation and 
disposal; explosive and accelerant detecting canines; crisis management response; 
alcohol and tobacco diversion crimes, the proceeds of which fund terrorist and criminal 
enterprises; arson investigation and prosecution; and criminal investigative analysis 
(arson and explosives profiling).  ATF operational support and services available to 
Federal, State, and local entities include the National Tracing Center, explosive and 
accelerant detecting canines, the National Explosives Repository; National Response 
Teams, and forensic laboratory services. 
 
Session #7: Nevada Test Site (NTS) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and 
Counter Proliferation Training  
Chairman: Charles E. Sheville, Senior Project Specialist, National Center for 
Combating Terrorism  
The presentation provided an overview of the training and exercise support 
capabilities of the Nevada Test Site.  The NTS is a member of the National Domestic 
Preparedness Consortium formed in 1998 by the Department of Justice, Office for 
Domestic Preparedness (OPD).  The NTS is the National Center for Exercise Excellence 
and conducts training for the enhancement of the capabilities of the state and local 
jurisdictions to prepare to respond to incidents of terrorism involving weapons of mass 
destruction.  The NTS provides training and exercise support to the National Guard 
WMD Civil Support Teams, as well as active duty and reserve military organizations. 
The NTS is establishing the National Center for Combating Terrorism to maintain 
training and exercises in support of the current and future needs for the war on terrorism. 
 
4. Conclusions: 
This conference provided a valuable forum for highlighting and addressing the 
current issues facing agencies involved in Homeland Security such as what type of 
information sharing needs to take place, what are the best practices and methods currently 
out there, and what are the roles for not only the Intelligence Community but also such 
agencies as federal, state, and local law enforcement, private industry, the media, and the 
average American citizen.  Homeland Security presents a unique challenge to the United 
States that requires the involvement of a plethora of entities.  Even though the Office of 
Homeland Security is being tasked to head the charge, it will truly take the involvement 
of multiple resources developing innovative techniques to truly defense our homeland.  
The conference also taught me about the culture and role of local law enforcement 
agencies in Homeland Security.  The representatives from those agencies were very 
impressive in outlining their needs and desire to become integrated with the Intelligence 
Community.  They seem to be more innovative in how to integrate the two sides whereas 
the Intelligence Community seemed to be somewhat leery and desiring the law 
enforcement agencies to meet IC standards vice some middle road.  In order for 
Homeland Security to succeed vast improvements, need to be addressed regarding the 
relationship between the two realms.  
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5. Thesis Research Inputs: 
Most importantly, this conference provided a plethora of data to incorporate into 
my thesis.  Some of the highlights include: 
• Establishing points of contact for follow on research at key intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies 
• Learning about the case study method 
• Gaining knowledge on valuable resources such as JMIC, JIVU 
• Issues to incorporate into NS3156 syllabus such as coordination between 
the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, USCG 
integration, the case study method (which cases to use), integrated 
domestic communications, and HLS documents 
• NS3156 syllabus should build upon what’s already been done, not start 
from scratch 
• Possible thesis recommendation: discuss with JIVU about adding NS3156 
to course catalog to reach more consumers 
• Possible thesis recommendation: NS3156 should establish a joint 
collaborative environment to maximize student learning.  Instructors will 
have to learn to develop a teaching method consistent with the on-line 
realm.  No longer can instructors rely on standing in front of the classroom 
and teaching students.  NS3156 needs to incorporate a multi-sensory, 
student-centric approach.  Utilizing NPS Blackboard.com develops a 
student’s analytic production process and skill set. 
• NS3156 syllabus should not only educate students on intelligence support 
to HLS but also teach students to become HLS analysts. 
• Thesis should be careful using Homeland DEFENSE and SECURITY 
interchangeably. 
• I talked to CAPT Tom Ward (Navy 1630), Joint Forces Headquarters-
HLS.  He works on the JTF for HLS within Joint Forces Command as the 
J2.  He noted NORTHCOM is still sorting through moving around 
resources, manpower, etc. primarily because Secretary Rumsfeld put a cap 
on funding.  NORTHCOM will be stood up from existing forces in the 
DoD.  The new command will not have a traditional Joint Intelligence 
Center (JIC).  Rather, a Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) will be stood up 
as an intelligence consumer vice producer of raw intelligence.  CAPT 
Ward added the military intelligence side is not difficult to implement 
change for HLS.  Practices pretty much in place already.  The difficulty 
exists in working with law enforcement agencies such as the FBI who 
bring a very different intelligence perspective and culture.  CAPT Ward 
promised to make NORTHCOM briefs available later for consumption.   
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• After hearing Tom Shreeve’s brief on the Case Study Method strongly 
believe NS3156 should incorporate this teaching approach to enhance 
student learning.  The presentation provided a thorough education on the 
method and further discussion should follow.  Mr. Shreeve provided point 
of contact information and welcomes follow-on consultation. 
• Interagency Process module should look to incorporate the relationship 
between the FBI and CIA, role of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies.  NS3156 could invite members from the local law enforcement 
community in Monterey to speak to NS3156 students.  Possible panel 
discussion might include Ambassador Minott, Monterey chief of police, 
and someone with an FBI background to address the HLS interagency 
process. 
• If NS3156 looks to cater to DOJ officials then the course material might 
want to remain on the unclassified level or at least look to ways to ensure 
all participants have access to course material. 
• Another valuable resource to exemplify the HLS interagency process is 
looking at the work of the Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning working 
Group (TEW).  I have established a point of contact with Col Wilson 
(USMC ret.) to conduct follow on research.  Another valuable resource is 
the Law Enforcement Working Group headed by Kathleen Kiernan, 
Assistant Director, ATF, Office of Public and Governmental Affairs. 
• Module 8 objectives should include the point the US is a unique country 
based on initiative and thinking out of the box.  Students should become 
familiar with some of the grassroots work being done on information 
sharing and Homeland Security such as the TEW, Chicago Police 
Department’s CLEAR program, and NIMA’s Geographic Information 
System and GeoBase Concept. 
• A few items to take away from attending three days of discussion from 
various experts: 1) people are looking for a repository for HLS, 2) 
agencies like DIA, CIA, etc. deal in the classified realm and want law 
enforcement agencies to get on board with way “they” do business 
(Representative from Customs Department stated that takes too long for 
them), 3) where is the Office of HLS because everyone continues guessing 
what the intelligence needs are without set guidelines to follow, and 4) the 
Intelligence Community has a lot of refining to do to overcome cultural 
barriers between the various intelligence agencies on the federal, state, and 
local levels in order to develop an efficient intelligence system for 
Homeland Security. 
6. Miscellaneous Notes: 
• Conference Chair, Executive Director GETA:  FREDRICK THOMAS 
MARTIN began his career with the U.S. Intelligence Community in 1960 
on the front lines as a linguist and intelligence analyst in the Middle East. 
He retired from the National Security Agency as a computer scientist and 
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Deputy Director of their Information Services Group in 1998.  He then 
founded Martin Consulting Associates, Inc. to provide consulting and 
business development services on advanced information technology 
applications to meet the requirements of the Intelligence Community, 
other government agencies, and companies within the private sector.  Mr. 
Martin was an Adjunct Professor for twenty-five years at The American 
University in Washington, D.C., developing and teaching courses in 
mathematics, statistics, and computer science.  He is the author of the first 
commercially published book on current intelligence operations within the 
US Intelligence Community entitled, “TOP SECRET Intranet: How US 
Intelligence Built INTELINK, the Largest, Most Secure Network.”  Mr. 
Martin holds a masters degree in computer systems/operations research 
from the American University.  His undergraduate degree is in 
mathematics.  
• List of government experts represented:  CIA, NSA, NRO, DIA, ATF, 
DISA, DARPA, US Navy, Office of Homeland Security, IC CIO, IMO, 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
97 
APPENDIX F.  AFTER ACTION REPORT FROM INTERVIEW 
WITH MGEN BRUCE LAWLOR, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR 
PROTECTION AND PREVENTION, OFFICE OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
Note: The following is a copy of the After Action Report written on the MGEN Bruce 
Lawlor’s presentation entitled, “The Future of Homeland Security.”  The presentation 
was given to Naval Postgraduate School faculty and students on 05 November 2002, at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
  
Subject:  MGEN LAWLOR BRIEF-- “THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY” 
 
1. On November 5, 2002, MGEN Bruce Lawlor, Senior Director for Protection and 
Prevention, Office of Homeland Security gave a brief to NPS faculty and students 
entitled “The Future of Homeland Security.”  He provided a first hand account of 
the Office of Homeland Security’s overall strategy.  His presentation also 
provided suggestions for the NPS audience of possible areas of study for future 
research.  MGEN Lawlor outlined the operational directives of the Office of 
Homeland Security using an Army analogy of the deep battle, the close battle, and 
the rear battle.   
2. THE DEEP BATTLE:  The deep battle is overseas, interdiction of the threat 
before getting on US soil.  One example is surveillance of nuclear weapons 
smuggling abroad.  Another example is US Customs officials working with 
officials from other large foreign ports like Rotterdam, Tokyo, and Singapore to 
conduct shipping containers overseas.  An enormous concern for the Office of 
HLS is shipping containers.  The problem is how to detect nuclear material.  
Enhanced technology is required for active and passive detection of nuclear 
material.  Another example is extending surveillance through biometrics.  
Enhanced technology such as rapid fingerprinting is required to track entry and 
exits into and out of the country. 
3. THE CLOSE BATTLE:  The close battle is protecting our borders.  The required 
efficiency of the American system causes a bleeding out of security measures.  
Tracking land transportation along and within US borders remains a concern.  
Improved detection technology is required along US borders. 
4. THE REAR BATTLE:  The rear battle is made up of several components: 1) 
critical infrastructure, 2) monitoring transportation systems, 3) disrupting the 
threat, 4) preparing the response, and 5) communicating with the public.  HLS 
requires identification of critical infrastructure that supports society.  The need 
exists to look at systems not facilities.  One example is chlorine transportation 
safety through the rail system to ensure the water system remains in tact.  Systems 
should then break down into nodal analysis.  Detailed analysis is required to 
determine which critical infrastructure systems are actually critical.  A good 
measuring stick is whether penetration of the system leads to the death of 
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American lives.  Protection of all critical infrastructures is difficult given the open 
nature of American society.  Therefore, HLS officials need to think of different 
ways to protect critical infrastructures of the United States.  HLS also requires 
new and innovative ways to protect the US transportation system.  The federal 
government cannot afford to pay for all of it.  The idea of dual use is required to 
integrate security improvements with the demands of the private sector.  An 
example is shipping container safety.  Disrupting the threat entails increased 
involvement by the FBI, better tracking of foreign students in country, and 
developing an integrated intelligence system.  A misperception exists in the 
United States that a “green door” exists in Washington DC where all the secrets to 
disrupting the threat lay in the wings.  The reality is DC does not have the 
information to share.  The true front line of HLS intelligence and information 
collection lies with the cities themselves.  Police provide security mechanism to 
detect terrorist activity in the cities.  “Intel is in the communities.”  An enormous 
piece to the Department of Homeland Security is the creation of a state, local, and 
federal information-sharing network.  Another component of the rear battle is 
prepared response, addressing the issues of first responders.  One example is the 
dissemination of vaccinations.  The most important component of the rear battle is 
communicating with the public.  How do we take away the strategic threat of fear 
that is fundamental to terrorists?  HLS requires the DHS to conduct a PR 
campaign.  The DHS OUTREACH PROGRAM is providing information 
addressing steps people can take in their daily lives to instill the notion “the 
current situation is not hopeless.” 
5. Questions and Answers:  
A question and answer session followed MGEN Lawlor’s presentation.  The 
following is a list of some of the highlights: 
 DHS is learning from other HLS models in place in Israel, Britain, and 
France 
 The issue of protection vs. not instilling fear; DHS trying to tell folks to 
make individual judgments regarding what precautionary measures to take 
in order to feel safe.  After all, that is the American way.  Alerts help but 
intelligence very rarely gets exact details such as a time, place, and 
location. 
 HLD vs. HLS; HLD is used to distinguish between DoD operational 
functions (combat operations) from other supporting roles like intelligence 
gathering, and medical support which makeup HLS.  NORTHCOM is 
trying to reach out and establish communications with states in order to 
integrate military and civilian support.  However, currently the support 
structure is still in flux. 
 The main contribution the military can make to DHS is helping to provide 
a security mindset that deals with doctrine, tactics, procedures, and skills 
needed for HLS.  The military thinks in security terms to guide planning 
(Ex: Deep, close, and rear battle).  DHS has yet to develop an 
organizational security structure.  “Civilian sector just not used to thinking 
in this paradigm.”  This is where the military can make the greatest 
contribution to HLS. 
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3. HLS Intel Discussion: 
MGEN Lawlor also met with several NPS representatives to discuss the role of 
intelligence in DHS.  The following are some of the highlights from the meeting: 
 DHS needs to create an OPINTEL center where all-source fusion takes 
place. 
 DHS will have an Intelligence Directorate to coordinate intelligence 
efforts within DHS. 
 DHS is a customer of intelligence.  The Intelligence Directorate will 
generate intelligence requirements like the other agencies in the 
intelligence community but it will not have tasking authority.  The 
Administration feels tasking authority is not essential right now. 
 Analytical capability is needed and it doesn’t currently exist in DHS 
 From his perspective, no current organization within the US is good at 
domestic intelligence.  The FBI maintains a collective and investigative 
culture for developing material for prosecution purposes.  New DHS 
wants to create and analytical center or “domestic CIA” similar to 
Britain’s MI-5.  As a consumer DHS can conduct their own analysis and 
therefore requires a cadre of analysts.  However, the primary function of 
HLS is not to do intelligence.  This creates a problem for anyone involved 
in intelligence analysis within DHS because “if you’re good CIA will hire 
you.”  As a result, intelligence analysts in DHS become collateral, leading 
to a second-class analyst. 
 Policy-makers within the DoD have many misperceptions about the 
DoD’s ability to conduct domestic intelligence collection.  “Posse 
comitatus has nothing to do with intelligence.”  The barriers to domestic 
intelligence collection are policy barriers not legal ones.  When you go 
through the actual DoD regulations and guidelines there are no legal 
barriers to domestic intelligence collection.  DoD answers to domestic 
intelligence collection are based on misperceptions vice actual regulations.  
 Civilian authorities need to understand how the intelligence process 
works.  We have to overcome the “green door” misperceptions of 
intelligence in Washington DC listed above.  State and local officials need 
to understand no “green door” in Washington exists. 
 Domestic CONUS intelligence centers do not exist.  “Intelligence lies in 
St. Louis and the cities, not DC.”  The intelligence system must harness 
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APPENDIX G.  AFTER ACTION REPORT FROM 26 SEPTEMBER 
2002 TEW GROUP CONFERENCE 
To:   Distribution 
 
Subject:  TERRORIST EARLY WARNING WORKING GROUP 
CONFERENCE, LOS ANGELES, CA   26 SEP 02 
 
Attachments: 
1) Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group September meeting 
agenda 
2) TEW September 2002 OSINTrep 
3) TEW Phonebook (September 26, 2002) 
4) LtCol Kempfer Consequence Management Intelligence briefing handout 
5) Article by TEW members: “Homeland Security: Beyond Terrorism; 
Fourth Generation Warfare” 
 
1. Conference Summary:  LtCol Harold Kempfer (USMCR) invited me to attend 
the Terrorist Early Warning (TEW) working group conference in Los Angeles on 
September 26, 2002, to obtain inputs for my thesis (Developing NS3156 
Intelligence Support to Homeland Security).  The TEW provides a model and test 
case for understanding the intricacies of the interagency process occurring 
between organizations involved with Homeland Security concerns.  The one-day 
conference was held at the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center in 
Los Angeles, CA.  The Gilmore Commission sited the group as a model for 
interagency information sharing between several national entities (including 
executive and legislative actors).  The monthly meeting allows members to 
interact and openly discuss and debate issues impacting regional TEW.   
Conference agenda included LtCol Kempfer’s presentation on 
Consequence Management Intelligence and a roundtable discussion on recent 
OSINT trends and potentials, and threat issues.  Participation included TEW 
permanent cadre, as well as representatives from local, state and federal public 
safety and health agencies (including National Guard and local military actors), 
several research institutions (e.g., RAND), and utilities (water and power). The 
briefing focused on intelligence indications and warnings.  The roundtable session 
focused on building situational awareness for I&W and operational net 
assessment missions.  A sampling of participating agencies included LASD, 
LAPD, FBI, NCIS, USMC I MEF, CNG/9th CST, OES, LAFD, LACOFD, 
LACODHS, INS, US Customs, USCG, USAF OSI, RAND, US Attorney, LA 
District Attorney, Australian Federal Police, and TEW representatives from 
Orange and San Bernardino Counties.  Several national labs, and many other local 






Copy of brief is available for further discussion.  The following are highlights 
from LtCol Kempfer’s presentation on Consequence Management Intelligence: 
• Consequence Management is a critical part of the HLS intelligence 
tradecraft 
• Most agencies do not have a designated intelligence officer (i.e. Does the 
Fire Dept have an intelligence officer?  Probably not) therefore, how can 
agencies conduct consequence management intelligence? 
• He talked about his role as J2 of Consequence Management JTF in Kuwait 
April-August 2002. 
• Brief sought to teach people in TEW cadre of one of the skill sets needed 
for HLS intelligence tradecraft 
• Consequence Management places a greater demand on intelligence: 
medical, CBW, logistics, etc. 
• TEW cadre brings a lot of groups together to fuse knowledge piece 
together 
• Emphasized the importance of incorporating first responders (ex: nuke 
suitcase bomb scenario) 
• No one knows the national strategy for HLS…what are the benchmarks 
for agencies to follow?  Who determines when resources are turned 
on/off? 
• When in comes to HLS how do you get a common operational picture? 
• LA Emergency Operations Center relies on the media for real-time 
intelligence.  For example, news stations helicopters are like having UAVs 
on the battlefield. 
 
3. Roundtable Discussion Highlights:  Moderated by Deputy Mark Seibel, LA 
County Sheriff Department, the roundtable discussion focused on recent OSINT 
trends and potentials, and threat issues.  Some of the highlights included: 
• Representative from California Congressman’s office was on hand to 
provide inputs from the state level 
• Inputs provided from a wide range of agencies ranging from US Air 
Marshals to LAPD/LAFD to military reps from USAF OSI and National 
Guard. 
• Participants went around the room and openly shared information from 
their respective agencies.  For example, one rep from OSI shared recent 
indications and warnings about surveillance being done at local military 
installations. 
• Role of citizen reporting brought up by several members as contributing to 
successful investigation and apprehensions of possible terrorists. 
• Overwhelming amount of information sharing done on various HLS issues 
being dealt with in the region.  For example, participants discussed 
modeling, systems incorporation, case studies, terrorist suspect databases, 
and even recent reporting on indications and warnings of terrorist activity. 
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4. Conclusions:  This conference provided a great opportunity to conduct personal 
interviews with various representatives from the Intelligence Community as well 
as law enforcement.  I was able to gain firsthand knowledge of the TEW concept 
and how it is becoming a model for interagency facilitation and cooperation 
regarding HLS.  The fact I was personally invited by one of the guest speakers 
welcomed TEW cadre to share information with me that might not be obtained 
through secondary sources.  The conference provided an education on how 
different agencies and levels of government are interacting on information sharing 
and mutual cooperation regarding threats to Homeland Security.  
 
5. Thesis Research Inputs: 
 
• TEW provides a model for how the HLS interagency process is working at 
the grassroots level.  TEW efforts have been acknowledge federally by the 
Bush Administration’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Markle 
Center, and the Office of HLS.  Discussion of the TEW working group’s 
efforts should be incorporated into NS3156 module on the interagency 
process.  Other cities and regions around the country like Las Vegas, 
Orange County, CA, and San Bernadino County, CA are incorporating 
TEW concept.  With interest coming from the national-level the TEW is 
sure to be a model for HLS agencies to follow in the future.  I have been 
added to the TEW phonebook directory in order to track future efforts by 
the TEW working group. 
• Agencies involved in HLS are looking for national and federally mandated 
guidance from Washington D.C. 
• TEW working group provides a successful example of organizations 
coming together to conduct all-source fusion analysis for intelligence and 
law enforcement purposes. 
• TEW focuses on establishing an all-source fusion operations center for 
HLS 
• TEW has experienced bureaucratic problems in working with agencies 
inside the Beltway.  Consensus seems to be “Beltway talks about HLS but 
does not have an idea of what’s going on at the grassroots level to succeed 
in HLS within the United States.” 
• Army National Guard representative I talked to provided insight and 
perspective regarding the demands being placed upon reservists 
participating in HLS efforts. 
• TEW started by in 1996 to focus LA County efforts on terrorism and is 
now becoming a model for HLS interagency information sharing and 
intelligence dissemination. 
• TEW is like bringing together a MAGTF or BATGRU to conduct; 
multiple assets being synchronized for a common strategic mission. 
• I learned about how different agencies are getting around classification 
obstacles commonly hindering interagency information sharing.  TEW 
focuses on declassifying information so all participants can tap into 
resources. 
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• I was able to establish several points of contact and given access to TEW 
resources for follow-on research. 
• One question to tackle is how can the TEW model be incorporated at the 
state and federal levels.  TEW is working at the regional level in Los 
Angeles County but with growing interests coming from the Office of 
HLS how can TEW concept be incorporated by larger bureaucratic 
organizations like the Office of HLS? 
• From my interviews I learned about some of the current holes in the 
interagency process such as integration of Coast Guard assets, the lack of 
a centralized opintel center for HLS, the lack of a network-centric 
communication tool for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
share information, and the need for standardization from the Office of 
Homeland Security to guide information sharing efforts, unity of effort, 
and command and control responsibilities.  These problem areas are good 
topics for NS3156 student briefs and policy papers. 
• Recommend Dudley Knox Library folks and NS3156 contact Sgt John 
Sullivan to be added to TEW phonebook for further information sharing. 
 
6. Miscellaneous Notes: 
• POCs:  
LtCol Harold Kempfer, USMCR, J2 C/JTF-CM, (562)-984-2050) 
 Sgt John Sullivan, TEW/Emergency Operations Bureau, 323-980-2292 
 Deputy Mark Seibel, TEW Admin, 562-984-2050 
Capt Phillip Carter, Anti-Terrorism/FP Officer 40th Inf Div (Mech), (310)-
428-8842 
• TEW also publishes a monthly OSINTrep document for dissemination to 
TEW members.  I obtained a copy if anyone is interested in reviewing. 
• Also obtained a copy of LtCol Kempfer’s brief if anyone is interested. 
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